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This article examines the recently disclosed, presidentially authorized program of warrantless 
electronic surveillance by the National Security Agency (NSA).  Critics of the program say it 
violates the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) and the Fourth Amendment.  
Supporters counter that it falls within the President's congressionally irreducible power to protect 
national security and within the relaxed Fourth Amendment governing national security 
searches.  This article focuses on an aspect of the controversy to which neither critics nor 
supporters have paid much attention: the connection between the issues of whether the NSA 
program violates FISA and whether it violates the Fourth Amendment.  The article concludes 
that the President can authorize surveillance that violates FISA when such surveillance "outside 
FISA" is reasonably necessary to respond to a genuine national security emergency.  That 
same emergency will ordinarily bring the surveillance within the exigent circumstances doctrine 
of the Fourth Amendment, as modified by the special needs doctrine.  This overlap between 
presidential power to ignore an Act of Congress and to act free of traditional Fourth Amendment 
constraints is not mere coincidence.  Both the separation of powers doctrine and Fourth 
Amendment doctrine limit executive power but carve out an area in which the President may act 
free of ordinary constraints when necessary to protect the nation.  It is hoped that the analysis 
underlying this conclusion is more nuanced (and stakes out a more moderate position) than that 
offered by most critics and supporters of the NSA program.  The analysis may, therefore, supply 
a legal foundation for principled and politically feasible legislative reform. In any event, the 
analysis offered here also informs the broad, ongoing debate over the proper roles of Congress 
and the federal courts in enforcing the Fourth Amendment. 
 
* Professor, University of Idaho College of Law.  I thank William C. Banks, Louis Fisher, Ken Gormley, 
Orin S. Kerr, David S. Kris, Timothy Lynch, Judge Richard A. Posner, Andrew M. Siegel, and Christopher 
Slobogin for helpful comments on drafts of this article.   
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Introduction 
 
The President has been spying on Americans again.1 The current domestic spying 
program began right after 9/11 and is conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA) for the 
 
1 Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K. Elsea, Congressional Research Service, Presidential Authority to 
Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information (Jan. 5, 2006), at 
1-2 [hereinafter CRS Report on Warrantless Surveillance], available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on 
Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. This is not the first time that a U.S. President 
has used electronic surveillance to spy on Americans supposedly for national security reasons.  Indeed, 
the practice goes back at least to Franklin D. Roosevelt, as the Church Committee disclosed in the 
1970s.  The Church Committee's revelations led to enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, which is at the center of the current controversy.  See Margaret Ebrahim, Warrantless Surveillance 
Debated during Ford Term: The Dispute Was Similar to the Current One Between Congress and the 
White House, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 4, 2006, at A10, 2006 WLNR 2001538 (reporting that 200 pages of 
historic records "reflect a remarkably similar dispute between the White House and Congress fully three 
decades before President Bush's acknowledgement [in December 2005] that he authorized wiretaps 
without warrants of some Americans in terrorism investigations"); Scott Shane, For Some, Spying 
Controversy Recalls a Past Drama, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at A18 (comparing post 9/11 domestic 
surveillance program to surveillance programs that came to light in the 1970s and that led to legislative 
reform); Karen Dorn Steele, Yakima's Spy Outpost: Secrecy Shrouds NSA Installation Monitoring West 
Coast, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Spokane, WA), Feb. 5, 2006, at 1A ("The current NSA controversy is a 
flashback to the 1960s and '70s, when NSA, the CIA and the FBI were caught illegally spying on 
journalists, congressmen, and peace activists.").   
3purpose of detecting and preventing eventuation of threats posed by international terrorists.2
The NSA program has been thought to raise two issues.3 One issue is whether the program 
violates the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).4 This FISA issue arises 
because the NSA program involves electronic surveillance (e.g., wiretapping) that is subject to 
FISA but has occurred without FISA compliance.  The second issue is whether the program 
violates the Fourth Amendment.5 This Fourth Amendment issue arises because surveillance 
under the NSA program occurs without prior judicial authorization or traditional probable cause.6
Public debate on the surveillance program is correct to distinguish the FISA issue from the 
Fourth Amendment issue; they require different analyses.  Public debate has not, however, paid 
enough attention to the connection between the FISA issue and the Fourth Amendment issue.7
This article attempts to fill the gap. 
 
2 See ACLU v. NSA,  No. 06-CV-10204, 2006 WL 2371463, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2006); Letter from 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of U.S., to Sen. Arlen Specter 1 (Feb. 28, 2006) [hereinafter 
Attorney General Letter of Feb. 28, 2006] (stating that the President authorized the "Terrorist Surveillance 
Program" in October 2001, before signing the USA PATRIOT Act), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/022806gonzales.pdf; George W. Bush, President of the U.S., 
President's Radio Address (Dec. 17, 2006), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html (President states that he authorized 
the NSA program "[i]n the weeks following the terrorist attacks on our nation"). 
3 See, e.g., Jerry Crimins, NSA Wiretaps Debated at U of Chicago, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. 1 (Feb. 1, 2006) 
(reporting that in public debate Professor Geoffrey R. Stone said the "two primary arguments" against 
current program are that it violates the Fourth Amendment and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act). 
4 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862.  For an example of the argument that the program violates FISA, see, e.g.,
Beth Nolan et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2006, at __.  For a 
description of FISA, see Richard Henry Seamon & William Dylan Gardner, The Patriot Act and the Wall 
Between Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 319, 337-58 (2005). 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
6 See Wartime Executive Power and the NSA's Surveillance Authority II: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. 
On the Judiciary, 109th Cong. __ (Feb. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Senate Hearing of Feb. 28, 2006] 
(testimony of Ken Gormley, Professor of Constitutional Law, Duquesne University) (arguing that "the 
program directly collides with rights of American persons under the Bill of Rights, specifically the Fourth 
Amendment"), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1770&wit_id=5228. 
7 The connection goes unexplored, for example, in the only published decision so far to address the 
constitutionality of the program.  See ACLU v. NSA, 2006 WL 2371463, at *17-*27 (holding the Program 
unconstitutional). 
4The article reaches a twofold conclusion.  First, the President may defy FISA in certain 
circumstances by authorizing electronic surveillance that is subject to FISA but that occurs 
without compliance with FISA's standards and procedures.8 Furthermore, the very same 
circumstances that justify such surveillance "outside FISA"9 can often cause the surveillance to 
satisfy the Fourth Amendment even though conducted without a warrant or traditional probable 
cause.10 By the same token, when circumstances do not justify surveillance outside FISA, the 
government's violation of FISA presumptively violates the Fourth Amendment.11 
The circumstances that excuse compliance with both FISA and traditional Fourth 
Amendment requirements are ones that constitute a genuine national security emergency.  
Precedent suggests that in a "genuine emergency" the President has inherent and 
congressionally irreducible power to respond to national security threats. 12 Although at first 
blush the Court's recent decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld13 might be understood to cast doubt 
on the existence of such plenary presidential power, on closer examination Hamdan actually 
supports its existence.  A genuine national security emergency may not only justify Presidential 
action that defies an Act of Congress; a genuine emergency may create exigent circumstances 
justifying searches and seizures without the usual Fourth Amendment requirements of probable 
cause and prior judicial approval.  In the absence of a "genuine emergency" that necessitates 
defiance of FISA, however, the President's failure to comply with FISA should be presumed to 
 
8 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.  
9 This article follows a convention of current public debate by using the phrase "surveillance outside FISA" 
to describe electronic surveillance that is subject to FISA but authorized by the President to be carried out 
without complying with FISA. See, e.g., CRS Report on Warrantless Surveillance, supra note __, at 14 
(referring to "the President's authorization of electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence 
information outside the FISA framework"); United States Department of Justice, Legal Authorities 
Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006), at 
18 (referring to "surveillance outside the procedures set forth in FISA") [hereinafter DOJ White Paper]; id.
at 19 n.6 (referring to communications intercepted "outside FISA procedures"). 
10 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.  
11 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.  
12 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, 
and concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that government could detain a citizen in a "genuine 
emergency," even if that detention violated an Act of Congress); see also infra notes __-__ and 
accompanying text. 
13 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
5violate the Fourth Amendment because FISA was designed by Congress, in collaboration with 
the Executive branch, to implement the Fourth Amendment. 
 The President's power to authorize surveillance outside FISA in a genuine national 
security emergency does not justify the current NSA surveillance program.  The program's very 
status as an ongoing, broad "program" prevents it from falling within the President's "genuine 
emergency" power.  The genuine emergency power is limited in scope and duration when it is 
exercised against the backdrop of legislation, such as FISA, that is a generally valid regulation 
of the President's power to conduct domestic surveillance for national security purposes.  For 
example, the President may well have had broad power to conduct surveillance outside FISA in 
the days and weeks immediately after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  That power 
subsided, however, as time and a still-functioning civil government permitted the President to 
consult Congress on the appropriate scope of surveillance powers.  Today, the President may 
still have power to authorize surveillance outside FISA.  That power, however, exists only when 
FISA's shortcomings make surveillance outside FISA reasonably necessary for national security 
purposes.  In sum, the President's "genuine emergency" power no longer supports a broad 
surveillance program that violates a generally valid Act of Congress. 
 This analysis underlying this conclusion unfolds in three steps.  Part I briefly describes 
publicly available information on NSA's domestic surveillance program and the legal controversy 
over it.  Part II discusses the connection between the President's power to authorize electronic 
surveillance outside FISA and Fourth Amendment limits on that power.  Principles that emerge 
from that discussion are applied to the NSA program in Part III of the article.  Part III concludes 
that, although in exceptional circumstances the President can authorize surveillance that 
violates FISA and does not satisfy customary Fourth Amendment requirements, the current 
NSA program of routine, widespread surveillance exceeds the President's power and violates 
the Fourth Amendment.   This conclusion reflects a more nuanced analysis (and stakes out a 
more moderate position) than is offered by most opponents and supporters of the NSA program.  
6I hope, for that reason, that the analysis offered here supplies a legal foundation for principled 
and politically feasible legislative reform.14
I. The NSA Program of Domestic Surveillance for International Terrorists 
 International terrorists attacked the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11).15 Soon 
after 9/11, the President authorized a surveillance program to investigate those attacks and 
prevent future ones.16 The program is run by the National Security Agency ("NSA") and 
involves electronic surveillance, such as wiretapping telephones.17 Many details of the program 
remain secret.18 The government admits, however, that NSA monitors phone calls and email 
that are made (1) to or from the United States and a foreign country; (2) by, or to, someone 
whom the government has a "reasonable grounds" to believe has ties to al Qa'eda, the terrorist 
network responsible for the 9/11 attacks, "or an affiliated terrorist organization."19 The 
 
14 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text (citing and discussing current commentary).  I am not 
aware of any published scholarship examining the connection between the issue of whether the current 
NSA program violates FISA and the issue of whether it violates the Fourth Amendment.  The connection 
does receive attention, however, in a recent court filing by the Center for National Security Studies and 
The Constitution Project.  See Memorandum of the Constitution Project and the Center for National 
Security Studies in Response to U.S. Department of Justice's Defense of Warrantless Electronic 
Surveillance at 42-46, In re Warrantless Electronic Surveillance (filed Feb. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Amicus 
Memo, In re Warrantless Electronic Surveillance], available at 
http://www.cnss.org/FISC%20Memorandum%20(signed).PDF. 
15 See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller with David E. Sanger, A Somber Bush Says Terrorism Cannot Prevail,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A1. 
16 See Attorney General Letter of Feb. 28, 2006, supra note __, at 1 (stating that the President authorized 
the "Terrorist Surveillance Program" about which Gonzales previously testified before Congress in 
October 2001, before signing the USA PATRIOT Act). 
17 Wartime Executive Power and the NSA's Surveillance Authority I: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. On 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong,. __ (Feb. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Senate Hearing of Feb. 6, 2006] (testimony of 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of U.S.) ("[T]his program is administered by career professionals 
at NSA."), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1727&wit_id=3936; id. at __ 
(testimony of Attorney General Gonzales) ("[T]he NSA did not commence the kind of electronic 
surveillance which I am discussing here today prior to the president's authorization."). 
18 Senate Hearing of Feb. 6, 2006, supra, note __, at __(testimony of Attorney General Gonzales) ("Many 
operational details of our intelligence activities remain classified and unknown to our enemy."). 
19 Senate Hearing of Feb. 6, 2006, supra note __, at __ (testimony of Attorney General Gonzales) (stating 
that "only international communications are authorized for interception" -- i.e., "communications between 
a foreign country and this country" -- and that surveillance is triggered "only when a career professional at 
the NSA has reasonable grounds to believe that one of the parties to a communication is a member of 
agent of Al Qaida or an affiliated terrorist organization"); DOJ White Paper, supra note 5, at ("The 
President has acknowledged that, to counter this [al Qaeda] threat, he has authorized the NSA to 
intercept international communications into and out of the United States of persons linked to al Qaeda or 
related terrorist organizations."). 
7government also seemingly admits that some of this surveillance is subject to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA") but has not been conducted in compliance with 
FISA's requirements.20 This admission means that the NSA program may be illegal on either of 
two grounds (or both). 
 First, the NSA program may violate FISA.  FISA prescribes "the exclusive means by 
which electronic surveillance [for foreign intelligence purposes] … may be conducted" in the 
United States.21 FISA's legislative history confirms that Congress intended FISA to govern all 
domestic electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.22 Congress made FISA 
 
20 See Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal 
Deputy Director for National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2006) (statement of Attorney General Gonzales) ("[I]in 
terms of legal authorities, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provides -- requires a court order --
before engaging in this kind of surveillance that I've just discussed and the President announced on 
Saturday, unless … otherwise authorized by statute or by Congress.") [hereinafter Attorney General 
Press Briefing of Dec. 2005], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051219-1.html; cf. DOJ White Paper, supra 
note __, at 17 n.5 ("To avoid revealing details about the operation of the program, it is assumed for 
purposes of this paper that the activities described by the President constitute 'electronic surveillance,' as 
defined by FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)."); Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, 
U.S. Dept of Justice, to Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, U.S. House of Rep. Judiciary 
Comm., encl. at 10 (Mar. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Moschella Letter of Mar. 24, 2006] (stating that DOJ 
Whitepaper "assumes, solely for purposes of that analysis, that the targeted interception of international 
communications authorized under the President's Terrorist Surveillance Program would constitute 
'electronic surveillance' as defined in FISA, but Department "cannot confirm whether that is actually the 
case without disclosing sensitive classified information"), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj032406.pdf. 
21 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f).  Section 2511(2)(f) also authorizes "electronic surveillance … and the 
interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications" to occur under Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("Title III") and under Chapter 121 of Part I of Title 18, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712.  Title III authorizes wiretaps for criminal investigations, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516 & 
2518(3)(a) (wiretap order requires probable cause that individual targeted for the wiretap is involved in 
one of enumerated offenses), and Chapter 121 concerns access to stored electronic communications, 
such as email messages for the investigation of criminal offenses.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (generally 
prohibiting unauthorized access to "a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage" in 
a "a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided"); id. § 1803(a) & (d) 
(authorizing access to wire or electronic communications and customer records for an "offense under 
investigation" and for "an ongoing criminal investigation").  See generally Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to 
the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 
(2004) (explicating Chapter 121 and suggesting legislative revisions). The government has not claimed 
that either Title III or Chapter 121 supports the current NSA surveillance program, leaving FISA as the 
"exclusive" means of surveillance, under § 2511(2)(f).  In addition to the exclusivity provision in Section 
2511(2)(f), FISA provides: "A person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally engages in electronic 
surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute."  50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1). 
22 The exclusivity provision in Section 2511(2)(f) of FISA replaced a provision in Title III stating that Title III 
did not limit the President's power to "take such measures as he deems necessary" to protect national 
security.  Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 802, 82 Stat. 
8exclusive to stop executive abuses exposed in the 1970s through efforts such as the Church 
Committee investigations.23 The Church Committee revealed that Presidents since Franklin D. 
Roosevelt had authorized warrantless surveillance of Americans.24 Although Presidents 
claimed "inherent" power to authorize this surveillance for "national security" purposes, the 
surveillance often targeted people merely because of their political views.25 By enacting FISA in 
1978, Congress intended to "prohibit the President, notwithstanding any inherent powers," from 
 
214 (1968), repealed by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 201(c), 92 
Stat. 1797.  Because the prior provision was designed to preserve the President's "inherent" constitutional 
authority, if any, to authorize surveillance that was not authorized by any statute, its repealer reinforces 
Congress's intent to eliminate the President's inherent power in this area, to the extent Congress was 
able to do so.  So does Congress's enactment of § 2511(2)(f) instead of proposed provisions that, unlike 
§ 2511(2)(f), continued to recognize possible inherent presidential power to conduct national security 
surveillance without statutory authorization.  See S.3197, 94th Cong. § 2528, reprinted in Hearings on S. 
743, S. 1888, S. 3197 Before the Subcomm. On Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Sen. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 94th Cong 134 (1976) (bill provision stating that legislation proposed in the bill would not "limit 
the constitutional power of the President to order electronic surveillance" for national security purposes); 
H. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1270, at 35 (1978) (observing that House version provided that FISA and Title III 
would be "the exclusive statutory means" by which President could conduct surveillance, but Conference 
selected Senate version, "which omits the word 'statutory'"); Ira S. Shapiro, The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act: Legislative Balancing of National Security and the Fourth Amendment, 15 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 119, 123 n.11 (1977) (quoting later version of S. 3197, 94th Cong. (1976), in which Senate 
Intelligence Committee narrowed the bill so that it referred to President's possible constitutional authority 
to conduct surveillance 'if the facts and circumstances giving rise to the acquisition are so unprecedented 
and potentially harmful to the Nation that they cannot reasonably be said to have been within the 
contemplation of Congress").  Other legislative history expresses Congress's intent in FISA to eliminate 
the President's inherent power to conduct national security surveillance.  See S. REP. No. 95-604, pt. I, at 
6 (1978) (bill enacted as FISA "recognizes no inherent power of the President in this area"); id. at 64 ("As 
to methods of acquisition which come within the definition of 'electronic surveillance' in this bill, the 
Congress has declared that this statute, not any claimed presidential power, controls."); H.R. REP. No. 95-
1283, pt. 1, at 24 (1976) ("[E]ven if the President has the inherent authority in the absence of legislation to 
authorize warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, Congress has the power to 
regulate the conduct of such surveillance by legislating a reasonable procedure, when then becomes the 
exclusive means by which such surveillance may be conducted."); see also Senate Hearing of Feb. 6, 
2006, supra note __, at __ (testimony of Attorney General Gonzales) ("There is no question, if you look at 
the legislative history [of FISA] …, that Congress intended to try to limit whatever president's inherent 
authority existed."). 
23 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-604, at 8 (1977) (bill that became FISA "is designed …. to curb the practice 
by which the Executive Branch may conduct warrantless electronic surveillance on its own unilateral 
determination that national security justifies it"); see also Richard Henry Seamon & William Dylan 
Gardner, The Patriot Act and the Wall Between Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL'Y 319, 336-37 & nn. 66-71 (2005) (discussing and citing relevant legislative history). 
24 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-604, at 7-8 (1977). 
25 See, e.g., id. at 8. 
9conducting domestic electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes without complying 
with FISA.26
Ever since the post-9/11 NSA program of domestic surveillance came to light in late 
2005, however, President George W. Bush has claimed both statutory and constitutional power 
to conduct surveillance "outside FISA."  The statutory power, he contends, comes from post-
9/11 legislation entitled the "Authorization for the Use of Military Force" ("AUMF").27 He also 
claims "inherent constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and sole organ for the Nation in 
foreign affairs."28 
26 See note __ supra (citing legislative history of FISA indicating Congress's intent that FISA be the 
exclusive source of executive branch power to conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence 
information); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. I, at (1978) ("[D]espite any inherent power of the 
President to authorize warrantless electronic surveillances in the absence of legislation, by this bill [and 
Title III …, Congress will have legislated with regard to electronic surveillance in the United States, that 
legislation with its procedures and safeguard prohibit the President, notwithstanding any inherent powers, 
from violating the terms of that legislation.").  Section 111 of FISA makes clear that Congress intended 
FISA to apply -- to the exclusion of the President's inherent powers -- even during wartime.  Section 111 
says, "[T]he President, through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a 
court order … to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days 
following a declaration of war by the Congress."  50 U.S.C. § 1811.  I thank Louis Fisher for pointing out 
to me the significance of this provision.  E-mail from Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist in Separation of 
Powers, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, to Richard Henry Seamon, Professor of 
Law, University of Idaho college of Law (July 12, 2006 6:59 AM) (on file with author). 
27 See, e.g., Attorney General Press Briefing of Dec. 2005, supra note __ ("Our position is that the 
authorization to use force, which was passed by the Congress in the days following September 11th,
constitutes th[e] other authorization [to which FISA refers] … to engage in this kind of signals 
intelligence."); Senate Hearing of Feb. 6, 2006, supra note __, at __ (testimony of Attorney General 
Gonzales) ("[T]he resolution authorizing the use of military force is exactly the sort of later statutory 
authorization contemplated by FISA's safety valve."); see also Authorization for Use of Military Force, 
Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat, 224 (Sept. 18, 2001), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note 
(Authorization for Use of Military Force). 
28 See Senate Hearing of Feb. 6, 2006, supra note __, at __ (testimony of Attorney General Alberto R. 
Gonzales) (President's "inherent authorities" under Constitution "include the power to spy on enemies like 
Al Qaida without prior approval from other branches of government"); DOJ White Paper, supra note __, at 
1 (to the same effect). 
10
The President's reliance on the AUMF is weak.29 The AUMF in relevant part authorizes 
the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, 
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the [9/11] terrorist 
attacks."30 The problem is that, in context, the term "force" cannot be reasonably construed to 
authorize domestic electronic surveillance.  Not coincidentally, members of Congress have 
almost universally rejected the President's reliance on the AUMF.31 Because the AUMF does 
not authorize the NSA program, the President's power to authorize the NSA program depends 
on his constitutional powers, as validly reduced by FISA.32 
29 See, e.g., Senate Hearing of Feb. 28, 2006, supra note __, at __ (prepared statement of Harold Hongju 
Koh, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) 
(President's reliance on AUMF "does not pass the 'straight face' test"), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1770&wit_id=3938; American Bar Association, Task Force 
on Domestic Surveillance in the Fight Against Terrorism, Report 5 (Feb. 2006) ("There is nothing in either 
the language of the AUMF or its legislative history" to support NSA surveillance program) [hereinafter 
ABA Task Force Report on NSA Surveillance], available at 
http://www.abanet.org/op/greco/memos/aba_house302-0206.pdf; see also ACLU v. NSA, 2006 WL 
2371463, at *23-*24 (holding that NSA program is not authorized by AUMF).  But see DOJ White Paper, 
supra note __, at 10 ("The AUMF confirms and supplements the President's inherent power to use 
warrantless surveillance against the enemy in the current armed conflict.") (capitalization altered); Andrew 
C. McCarthy et al., NSA's Warrantless Surveillance Program: Legal, Constitutional, and Necessary 60-63  
in THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE AND THE CONSTITUTION (undated) (arguing that 
AUMF supports NSA program), http://www.fed-soc.org/pdf/terroristsurveillance.pdf Letter from Robert Alt, 
Fellow in Legal and International Affairs, John M. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs, to Hon. James 
Sensenbrenner, Jr., 2 (Feb. 2006) ("[T]he scope of the President's electronic surveillance program … is 
consistent with the scope of the AUMF's authorization of the use of force."), available at 
http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/dialogue/alt_judiciary.html. 
30 AUMF § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Authorization for Use of Military 
Force). 
31 See, e.g., Senate Hearing of Feb. 6, 2006, supra note __, at __ (statement of Sen. Specter) (stating 
that in his opinion AUMF does not authorize the NSA program). But cf. Letter from Sen. Pat Roberts to 
Sens. Arlen Specter and Patrick J. Leahy 17 (Feb. 3, 2006) (defending surveillance program primarily 
based on president's inherent powers but stating: "I do not discount the legal arguments of the 
Department of Justice concerning the [AUMF]."), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_cr/roberts020306.pdf. 
32 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.  
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In addition to violating FISA, the NSA program may violate the Fourth Amendment.33
The Fourth Amendment applies to some electronic surveillance, because electronic surveillance 
can constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.34 Reflecting a 
traditional Fourth Amendment requirement, FISA ordinarily requires the government to get a 
court order before conducting electronic surveillance.35 To get a court order, the government 
must show "probable cause" that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a 
foreign power.36 FISA's requirement for a court order based on probable cause, combined with 
the other FISA requirements, has led courts to reject Fourth Amendment challenges to 
surveillance that complies with FISA.37 By the same token, surveillance outside FISA may 
 
33 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., William Banks, NSA Eavesdropping and the Fourth Amendment,
JURIST-FORUM, Mar. 8, 2006 (arguing that "this domestic spying violates the Fourth Amendment"), 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/03/nsa-eavesdropping-and-fourth-amendment.php; Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2 ¶ 3 & 59 ¶ 193, American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security 
Agency, Civ. No. 06-CV-10204 (E.D. Mich. filed Jan. 17, 2006) [hereinafter ACLU v. NSA] (alleging 
program violates Fourth Amendment), available at http://cdt.org/security/nsa/20060117aclu-complaint.pdf; 
Complaint at 2 ¶ 2 & 15 ¶ 50, Center for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-CV-00313 (S.D.N.Y. filed 
Jan. 17, 2006) [hereinafter CCR v. Bush] (similar allegations), available at http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/legal/govt_misconduct/docs/NSAcomplaintFINAL11706.pdf; cf. Letter from Curtis A. Bradley, 
Richard and Marcy Horvitz Professor of Law, Duke Univ., to Sen. Bill Frist et al. 5 (Jan. 9. 2006) 
[hereinafter Law Professors' Letter to Congress] (stating that program raises serious Fourth Amendment if 
considered to be statutorily authorized), available at 
http://www.cdt.org/security/20060109legalexpertsanalysis.pdf. 
34 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that search occurred when 
government attached an electronic listening device to outside of phone booth and overhead the person 
speaking on the phone inside the booth); see also Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 326-31 (1967) 
(rejecting constitutional challenge to government's electronic recording of conversation when government 
first obtained warrant authorizing the recording); Richard H. Seamon, Kyllo v. United States and the 
Partial Ascendance of Justice Scalia's Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U.L.Q. 1013, 1013-14 (2001) 
(discussing applicability of Fourth Amendment to technological developments in surveillance). 
35 50 U.S.C. § 1805. 
36 Id. § 1805(a)(3)(A). 
37 United States v. Damrah, 124 F. App'x 976, 983 (6th Cir. 2005) ("FISA has uniformly been held to be 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment."); see, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 736-46 (Foreign Int. 
Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to FISA); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 
1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987) ("We now join the other courts of appeals that have reviewed FISA and held 
that the statute meets constitutional requirements."); United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790 (9th 
Cir. 1987) ("FISA satisfies the constraints the Fourth Amendment places on foreign intelligence 
surveillance conducted by the government."); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73 (2d Cir. 1984) 
("We regard the procedures fashioned in DISA as a constitutionally adequate balancing of the individual's 
Fourth Amendment rights against the nation's need to obtain foreign intelligence information."). 
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violate the Fourth Amendment precisely because it occurs without a court order38 and without 
meeting the other requirements of FISA, possibly including its substantive standard of "probable 
cause." 39 
Public debate on the NSA program has centered on whether it violates FISA or the 
Fourth Amendment.40 The debate has not scrutinized the connection between the FISA issue 
and the Fourth Amendment issue.  Nor was the connection detected, much less explored, in the 
only published court opinion so far to address a legal challenge to the NSA program.41 Indeed, 
the significance of the connection between the FISA issue and the Fourth Amendment issue is 
not obvious.  In commenting on a draft of this article, Judge Richard Posner asked why this 
connection is important if, as this article concludes, the current NSA program violates both FISA 
and the Fourth Amendment.  To quote Judge Posner, "If the NSA program violates FISA, what 
 
38 See Attorney General Press Briefing of Dec. 2005, supra note __ (Attorney General Gonzales stating 
U.S.'s position that it is not legally required to get court approval for NSA surveillance program disclosed 
in December 2005). 
39 Compare DOJ White Paper, supra note __, at 5 (stating that surveillance under NSA program requires 
"a reasonable basis to believe that one party to the communication is a member of al Qaeda, associated 
with al Qaeda or a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda") with Alberto R. Gonzales, 
Prepared Remarks for Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at the Georgetown University Law Center 
(Jan. 24, 2006) ("the standard applied [for surveillance under NSA program] S 'reasonable basis to 
believe' S- is essentially the same as the traditional Fourth Amendment probable cause standard."); and 
Moschella Letter of Mar. 24, 2006, supra note __, encl. at 2-3 (Mar. 24, 2006) (equating "reasonable 
basis" standard to "probable cause"). 
40 See, e.g., Law Professors' Letter to Congress, supra note __, at 5  (arguing that program violates FISA 
and "would raise serious questions under the Fourth Amendment); Senate Hearing of Feb. 28, 2006, 
supra note __, at __ (testimony of Prof. Ken Gormley) (stating that NSA program violates FISA and 
Fourth Amendment); ABA Task Force Report on NSA Surveillance, supra note __, at 10, 13 (presenting 
two arguments: that "Congress did not implicitly authorize the NSA domestic spying program in the 
AUMF, and in fact expressly prohibited it in FISA"; and that "construing the AUMF to authorize such 
wiretapping would raise serious questions under the Fourth Amendment"); see also Complaint at 13-15, 
CCR v. Bush, supra note __ (alleging that NSA program violates, among other laws, FISA, separation of 
powers, and First and Fourth Amendments); Complaint at 59, ACLU v. NSA, supra note __  (alleging 
violations of First Amendment rights, separation of powers, and Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 
with the APA violation arising from program's violation of FISA). 
41 See ACLU v. NSA, 2006 WL 2371463, at *17-*27; see also Editorial, Ruling for the Law, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 18, 2006, at A16 (describing decision in ACLU v. NSA as holding that NSA program violated FISA,  
the Fourth Amendment, and the First Amendment); cf. Editorial, A Judicial Misfire, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 
2006, at A20 (observing that opinion in ACLU v. NSA "is neither careful nor scholarly"). 
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is the point of saying that therefore it also violates the Fourth Amendment?" 42 A court made the 
converse point in recently striking down the NSA program, stating the view that it is "irrelevant" 
whether the NSA program violates restrictions validly imposed by FISA because the program 
violates the Fourth Amendment.43
My contention, developed over the next two parts of this article, is that the NSA program 
violates the Fourth Amendment precisely because it violates FISA.  In other words, the NSA 
program violates the Fourth Amendment today -- because FISA is on the books -- even though 
the program may very well not have violated the Fourth Amendment before FISA was enacted 
and might very well not violate the Fourth Amendment if FISA were repealed.  Congress's 
enactment of a statute that is within Congress's power and that is designed to implement the 
Fourth Amendment alters the Fourth Amendment analysis.  In this sense, Congress can affect 
the substance of the Fourth Amendment.  Recognizing Congress’s power to enact statutes that 
alter Fourth Amendment reasonableness illuminates linkage between the Fourth Amendment 
and separation of powers doctrine. In addition, an understanding of the connection informs the 
broader debate on the roles of legislatures and courts in enforcing the Fourth Amendment.44 
II. Presidential Power to Conduct Domestic Electronic Surveillance for National Security 
Purposes Within Fourth Amendment Constraints 
 
The analysis of whether the NSA program violates FISA differs from, but overlaps with, 
the analysis of whether the NSA program violates the Fourth Amendment.  The issue of whether 
the program violates FISA requires a separation of powers analysis that draws a line between 
the President's power and Congress's power.45 The issue of whether the program violates the 
 
42 E-mail from Judge Richard Posner, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to Richard Henry 
Seamon, Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law (July 8, 2006 8:07 pm) (on file with 
author); see also ACLU v. NSA, 2006 WL 2371463 . 
43 ACLU v. NSA, 2006 WL 2371463, at *25. 
44 See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and 
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 804 (2004) (critiquing "popular view" that courts should take 
a primary role in enforcing privacy threatened by technology; urging an important role for legislature); cf.
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr's Misguided Call for Judicial 
Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747 (2005) (criticizing Professor Kerr's critique). 
45 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.  
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Fourth Amendment entails a reasonableness analysis that strikes a balance between 
governmental and individual interests.46 Despite this difference in analyses, the FISA issue and 
the Fourth Amendment issue overlap when it comes to identifying what the President can and 
cannot do.   
 Specifically, as discussed below in Section A, FISA is unconstitutional -- and the 
President can therefore disregard it -- when doing so is required by exigent circumstances of 
national security.47 Furthermore, electronic surveillance conducted under exigent national 
security circumstances will satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even if it does not meet the 
traditional Fourth Amendment requirements of prior judicial approval and probable cause, if, as 
will often be true, the surveillance falls within the exigent circumstances doctrine of Fourth 
Amendment law.   As discussed in Section B below, however, when national security exigencies 
do not exist, the President's failure to comply with FISA exceeds his authority and presumptively 
violates the Fourth Amendment.48 
The connection between the FISA issue and the Fourth Amendment issue reflects that 
both separation of powers doctrine and Fourth Amendment doctrine recognize plenary 
executive power when necessary to protect national security.  The second conclusion reflects 
that, outside of such exceptional circumstances, both separation of powers and Fourth 
Amendment doctrine support legislative and judicial checks on the executive to prevent 
executive abuse of individual rights. 
 A. Presidential Powers in a "Genuine Emergency" 
 As noted above, the President seemingly admits that after 9/11 he authorized "electronic 
surveillance" within the meaning of FISA without following FISA's requirements.49 As also noted 
above, this surveillance outside FISA is not authorized by the later-enacted AUMF (or any other 
 
46 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.  
47 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.  
48 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.  
49 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
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statute).50 Because neither the AUMF nor any other statute authorizes the surveillance, only the 
President's "inherent powers" can do so, and they can do so only to the extent that those 
inherent powers cannot validly be restricted by FISA.  To say that FISA invalidly restricts the 
President's inherent powers reflects a conclusion that FISA violates the separation of powers 
doctrine.51
I join other commentators in believing that analysis of this issue will be governed by 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer.52 In Youngstown, the Court invalidated President 
Truman's attempt to take over the nation's steel mills.  Truman attempted the takeover to ensure 
that, despite labor unrest, the mills would continue to produce materiel for the Korean War.53 
Truman argued that "his action was necessary to avert a national catastrophe which would 
inevitably result from a stoppage of steel production, and that in meeting this grave emergency 
[he] was acting within the aggregate of his constitutional powers as the Nation's Chief Executive 
and the commander in chief of the Armed Forces."54 The Court rejected that argument.  It held 
 
50 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
51 See, e.g., Attorney General Letter of Feb. 28, 2006, supra note __, at 5 ("[I]f an interpretation of FISA 
that allows the President to conduct the NSA activities were not fairly possible, and if FISA were read to 
impede the President's ability to undertake actions necessary to fulfill his constitutional obligation to 
protect the Nation from foreign attack in the context of a congressionally authorized armed conflict against 
an enemy that has already staged the most deadly foreign attack in our Nation's history, there would be 
serious doubt about the constitutionality of FISA as so applied."); McCarthy, supra note __, at 33-34 
(similar argument). 
52 343 U.S. 579 (1952).  See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 2006 WL 2371463, at *21-*24 (relying on Youngstown 
in analyzing NSA program); Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. __ (Jan. 9, 
2006) (testimony of Judge Samuel Alito) (stating that "I think one might look to Justice Jackson's 
framework" in Youngstown in addressing president's power to authorize NSA program); Senate Hearing 
of Feb. 6, 2006, supra note __, at __ (testimony of Attorney General Gonzales) ("[I]f Congress were to 
take some kind of action, and say the president no longer has the authority to engage in electronic 
surveillance of the enemy, then I think that would put us into the third part of Justice Jackson's three-part 
test" in Youngstown); ABA Task Force Report on NSA Surveillance, supra note __, at 13 (applying the 
"criteria set forth in Justice Jackson's famous concurring opinion in Youngstown" to analyze President's 
authorization of NSA program); Law Professors' Letter to Congress, supra note __, at 15 (relying on 
Justice Jackson's "influential opinion" in Youngstown to analyze President's power to authorize the NSA 
program).  But cf. McCarthy, supra note __, at 49-51 (Court's modern approach to separation of powers 
analysis is "more balanced and cautious" than Jackson's framework suggests when read in isolation). 
53 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585-89. 
54 Id. at 582. 
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that Truman's action was not authorized by any statute or any extra-statutory power that the 
President has under the Constitution.55
The most authoritative opinion from Youngstown has come to be, not the majority's 
opinion, but Justice Jackson's concurrence.56 In his concurrence, Justice Jackson set out a 
three-part framework for analyzing the President's power.57 The framework reflects the 
interdependence of the President and Congress in certain matters, including war.58 Under the 
first part of the framework, the President's power is "at its maximum" when he or she acts with 
the express or implied authorization of Congress.59 In this first situation, the President has "all 
[of the power] that he [or she] possesses in his [or her] own right plus all that Congress can 
delegate."60 The second part of the framework applies when the President acts with neither 
congressional approval nor congressional denial of his or her authority.  In this second situation, 
the President "can only rely upon his [or her] own independent powers." 61 The third part of the 
framework applies when the President takes action "incompatible with the expressed or implied 
will of Congress." 62 In this third situation, the President's power "is at its lowest ebb, for then he 
[or she] can rely only upon his [or her] own constitutional powers minus any constitutional 
 
55 Id. at 585 ("The President's power, if any, … must stem either from an act of Congress or from the 
Constitution itself."); id. at 585-88 (holding that executive order did not fall within any statute or 
constitutional power). 
56 Id. at 634-55 (Jackson, J., concurring); see, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981) 
(stating that, as parties in that case agreed, Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown "brings 
together as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this area"); Patricia L. Bellia, 
Executive Power in Youngstown's Shadow, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 89 n.11 (2002) (citing commentary 
recognizing influence of Jackson's concurrence); see also supra note __ (citing sources relying on 
Jackson's Youngstown framework to analyze President's power to authorize the current NSA surveillance 
program). 
57 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
58 Id. at 635. 
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 637. 
62 Id. at 637-38. 
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powers of Congress over the matter.  Courts can sustain exclusive President control in such a 
case only by disabling Congress from acting upon the subject."63
Justice Jackson's framework makes it important to determine whether the NSA program 
is authorized by -- or is instead inconsistent with -- the express or implied will of Congress.  The 
President argues that the NSA program is authorized by the AUMF, but this argument lacks 
merit.64 Without the AUMF to support it, electronic surveillance under the NSA program violates 
FISA and so presents Justice Jackson's third situation.  Accordingly, the surveillance can fall 
within the President's power, despite violating FISA, only to the extent that Congress is 
constitutionally "disable[ed]" from curbing the President's power.65 The question becomes to 
what extent Congress can regulate the President's conduct of domestic electronic surveillance 
for national security purposes. 
 Precedent establishes that Congress has some regulatory power in this matter, but the 
precedent leaves the scope of that power unclear.  The relevant precedent includes FISA itself, 
which was supported by Presidents Carter and Ford as a legitimate regulation of the President's 
power.66 Unfortunately, this legislative precedent has no direct analog in Supreme Court 
precedent.  The Supreme Court has said that Congress can regulate electronic surveillance in 
the United States to investigate national security threats posed by domestic organizations.67 
The Court has not addressed congressional regulation of surveillance of threats to national 
 
63 Id. at 637-38; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006) ("Whether or not the 
President has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, 
he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on 
his powers") (citing Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637). 
64 See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
65 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38. 
66 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (to issue order authorizing electronic surveillance, court must find that "the 
target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power"); see also id. §
1801(a) & (b) (defining "foreign power" and "agent of a foreign power"); Seamon & Gardner, supra note 
__, at 336-37 (documenting support of Ford and Carter Administrations for FISA). 
67 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 324 (1972) (Keith) ("prior judicial approval is 
required for the type of domestic security surveillance involved in this case and … such approval may be 
made in accordance with such reasonable standards as the Congress may prescribe"). 
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security posed by foreign agents and powers.68 Though not addressing that specific issue, the 
Court has recognized that Congress has significant power over foreign relations -- power that 
stems from, among other places, its power over foreign commerce.69 On the other hand, the 
Court has recognized that the President, too, has significant power over foreign affairs, including 
matters of foreign intelligence, that exists independently of Congress's power.70 Precedent 
does not establish to what extent the President's power is not only independent but also 
"plenary" -- meaning not reducible by Congress. 
 
68 See Senate Hearing of Feb. 28, 2006, at __ (testimony of Robert F. Turner) (stating that Keith case has 
been misunderstood as bearing on President's power to conduct surveillance of foreign threats to national 
security; Keith dealt only with "internal threats from domestic organizations"); id. at __ (stating that Keith 
"made no suggestion that Congress should put any constraints on foreign intelligence gathering"); see 
also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 533 (1985) (distinguishing surveillance of foreign threats to 
national security from surveillance of domestic threats to national security). Of course, although Keith 
does not address congressional regulation of surveillance of foreign threats to national security, nor does 
it cast doubt on Congress's power to regulate that subject.   
69 See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 351-52 (1903) ("the commerce with foreign countries … which 
Congress c[an] regulate … includ[es] … the transmission by telegraph of ideas, wishes, orders, and 
intelligence") (citing W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347 (1887)).  In addition to Congress's 
power to regulate the executive branch's gathering of foreign intelligence, Congress can regulate the 
federal courts' admission of evidence derived from that intelligence gathering, as Congress has done in 
FISA.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(e) (authorizing motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of FISA); 
see also Usery v. Tuner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 31 (1976) (stating that Congress "has plenary 
power over the promulgation of evidentiary rules for the federal courts").  See generally Max Kidalov & 
Richard H. Seamon, The Missing Pieces of the Debate Over Federal Property Rights Legislation, 27 
HASTINGS CONST'L L.Q. 1, 60-61 (1999) (discussing Congress's power to make rules for the federal 
courts). 
70 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (referring to "the very 
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the 
field of international relations -- a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of 
Congress"); see also Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 110 (1948) 
("Congress may of course delegate very large grants of its power over foreign commerce to the 
President.  The President also possesses in his [or her] own right certain powers conferred by the 
Constitution on him [or her] as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ in foreign affairs. [In those 
roles, he or she] has available intelligence services whose reports neither are nor ought to be published 
to the world.").  In citing Curtiss-Wright, I do not mean to endorse its reasoning, which has received 
withering, cogent criticism.  Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An 
Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (1973) (concluding that  "major segments" of Curtiss-Wright 
rest on history that is "shockingly inaccurate"); David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An 
Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 496 (1946) (finding "little room" for 
acceptance of Curtiss-Wright's concept of President's inherent extra-constitutional powers in "political and 
constitutional ideas" prevailing at time of American Revolution and framing of Constitution).  I am arguing 
that the President has some margin to act contrary to law, provided it is not very long and he or she gets 
statutory authority as quickly as possible.  In Curtiss-Wright, Sutherland saw no need for statutory 
authority.  The President had exclusive, independent, inherent, and extraconstitutional powers, not 
dependent at all on congressional support.  See E-mail from Louis Fisher, supra note __. 
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Though not providing clear guidance, history and precedent suggest that the President 
has congressionally irreducible power to "repel sudden attacks" on the country.71 In The Prize 
Cases, for example, the Court upheld the President Lincoln's power to blockade southern ports 
in the days after the Confederacy's attack on union forces at Fort Sumter.72 The Court made 
clear this power did not depend on legislative authorization, stating: "If a war be made by 
invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by 
force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any 
special legislative authority. … He must determine what degree of force the crisis demands."73 
Significantly,The Prize Cases was a 5-to-4 decision, with the four dissenters concluding that, 
because Congress had not declared war, "the President had no power to set on foot a 
blockade."74 The Court's decision, in substance and voting alignment, implies at most a narrow 
power in the President to take defensive measures in response to attacks on the country -- and 
 
71 See, e.g., Committee on International Security Affairs of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, 
The Legality and Constitutionality of the President's Authority to Initiate an Invasion of Iraq, 41 Colum. J. 
Transnat'l L. 15, 19 n.13 (2002) ("Messrs. Madison and Gerry jointly introduced the amendment to 
substitute 'declare' for 'make' [in the clause enumerating Congress's war power]. They noted the change 
would 'leav[e] to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.' M. Farrand, The Records of the 
Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937), at 318, cited in The Constitution of the United States of 
America: Analysis and Interpretation, Congressional Research Service (1992), at 308, note 1420."); see 
also War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2(c), 87 Stat. 555 (1973), (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 
1541(c)) ("The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States 
Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly 
indicated by the circumstances are exercised pursuant to [in addition to congressional authorization] … 
(3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, it territories or possessions, or its 
armed forces"); Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology 
Matters, 106 YALE L.J. 845, 852-63 (1996) (reviewing LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995)) 
(describing range of scholarly views on President's war powers, including power to repel imminent attacks 
on the country). Presidential power expert Louis Fisher traces the claim of presidential power to act 
contrary to law in cases of genuine emergency to the Lockean Prerogative.  See LOUIS FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 259-260 (rev. 4th ed. 1997).  Until 
recently, Presidents exercised the power but later sought authorization from Congress.  Id. at 260-62. 
72 The Amy Warwick ("The Prize Cases"), 67 U.S. 635 (1862). 
73 Id. at 670. 
74 Id. at 698 (Nelson, J., dissenting, joined by Taney, C.J., and Catron and Clifford, JJ.); see also Holmes 
v. United States, 391 U.S. 936, 946-947 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing The Prize Cases). 
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one that may exist in the absence of "special legislative authority" but that does not necessarily 
exist when it contradicts legislative authority.75
More recently, two Justices in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld recognized a similar, but broader, 
emergency power to respond to threats to national security.76 In Hamdi, Justice Souter  (joined 
by Justice Ginsburg) dissented from a decision upholding the detention of an asserted enemy 
combatant who is also a U.S. citizen.77 Justice Souter concluded that an Act of Congress 
barred the detention.78 He suggested, however, that the executive branch might be able to 
detain a citizen, even in violation of the statute, "in a moment of genuine emergency, when the 
Government must act with no time for deliberation."79 The plurality did not address this issue 
because it held -- contrary to Justice Souter's dissent (but in basic agreement with Justice 
Thomas's dissent) -- that the detention in that case was authorized by federal statute.80 The 
 
75 See also Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[W]hatever special powers the 
Executive may hold in national security situations must be limited to instances of immediate and grave 
peril to the nation.  Absent such exigent circumstances, there can be no appeal to powers beyond those 
enumerated in the Constitution or provided by law."); cf. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 177-79 (1804) 
(captain of U.S. vessel was personally liable in damages for seizing a vessel in violation of statute, even 
though the seizure comported with presidential orders, because presidential orders misconstrued the 
statute).  As Dr. Louis Fisher observed in commenting on a draft of this article, the Prize Cases may also 
be distinguishable from what is called the "global war on terrorism," of which the current NSA surveillance 
program is part, because President Lincoln acted in a domestic context, rather than in a context in which 
he was taking the country from a state of peace to a state of war with another nation.  See E-mail from 
Louis Fisher, supra note __ (citing Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 660 (argument of counsel for government, 
distinguishing foreign war from civil war)). 
76 542 U.S. 507 (2004); see also Joseph R. Biden, Jr, & John B. Ritch III, The War Power at a 
Constitutional Impasse: A 'Joint Decision' Solution, 77 GEO. L.J. 367, 372 (1988) (proposing a "joint 
decision" model under which presidential power to use force in absence of statutory authorization "derives 
from the concept of emergency: the need to repel an attack on the United States or its forces, to forestall 
an imminent attack, or to rescue United States citizens whose lives are imperiled"). 
77 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539-54 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the 
judgment, joined by Ginsburg, J.). 
78 Id. at 541. 
79 Id. at 552. 
80 Id. at 517 (O'Connor, J., announcing judgment of the Court and delivering an opinion in which 
Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy and Breyer, JJ., joined) (holding that "Congress has in fact authorized Hamdi's 
detention"); id. at 579-94 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding that President's detention of Hamdi fell within 
"powers vested in the President by the Constitution and with explicit congressional approval").  Justice 
Thomas believed that the plurality understood the President's power under the Constitution and the 
AUMF too narrowly.  See id. at 587-93.  Justice Thomas also disagreed with the Court's disposition, 
which remanded the case for Hamdi to have "a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for 
[his] detention" (id. at 509 (opinion of O'Connor, J., announcing judgment of the Court); id. at 553 (Souter, 
J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in remand)).  See id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding 
that "there is no reason to remand the case" because Hamdi's habeas challenge should fail). 
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Hamdi dissent implies that the President's power to take action "incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress" (the third situation identified by Justice Jackson's 
Youngstown concurrence) may include the power to take immediate action to respond to a 
"genuine emergency" threatening national security.81 Furthermore, the Hamdi dissent did not 
limit its implication of presidential power to situations involving an actual attack.  Indeed, even 
before Hamdi many commentators believed that the President's power encompasses taking 
defensive measures necessary to thwart imminent attacks.82 
Initially, the Court's recent decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld might be read to cast doubt 
on the existence of any plenary power in the President to defy an Act of Congress when he 
believes it necessary to respond to a national security threat.83 In Hamdan, the Court held that 
the President violated an Act of  Congress -- namely, the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) -- when he established military tribunals to try aliens detained in the war on terrorism.84 
The Court held that the President's order establishing the tribunals violated two UCMJ 
 
81 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
82 See Biden & Ritch, supra note __, at 398-99 (proposing legislation that authorizes the President, 
without additional statutory authority, to take various actions including "to forestall an imminent act of 
international terrorism known to be directed at citizens or nationals of the United States"); Stromseth, 
supra note __, at 862-863 (expressing the view that President has power without congressional consent 
to respond not only to actual attacks but also to "imminent attacks" and to "exercise the nation's 
fundamental right of self-defense when a foreign force "by its own actions placed the United States in a 
state of war"); Jane E. Stromseth, Collective Force and Constitutional Responsibility: War Powers in the 
Post-Cold War Era, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 145, 159 (1995) ("In exceptional cases, the President may 
determine that aggression short of an attack or imminent attack against the United States poses a threat 
to the country's security that is serious enough to warrant dispatching American forces into combat within 
a time frame that precludes prior approval from Congress."); William Van Alstyne, Congress, the 
President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9 (1972) ("[T]he 
lodgment of the power to declare war exclusively in Congress forbids the sustained use of armed force 
abroad in the absence of a prior, affirmative, explicit authorization by Congress, subject to the one 
emergency exception: an interim emergency defense power in the President to employ armed force to 
resist invasion or to repel a sudden armed attack until Congress can be properly convened to deliberate 
on the question as to whether it will sustain or expand the effort by specific declaration or, by doing 
nothing, require the President to disengage our forces from the theater of action."); cf. Martin v. Mott, 25 
U.S. 19, 29 (1827) (stating of Congress's power that "the power to provide for repelling invasions includes 
the power to provide against the attempt and danger of invasion, as the necessary and proper means to 
effectuate the object"). 
83 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).   
84 Id. at 2790-98. 
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provisions.  First, the President's order violated Article 36 of the UCMJ. 85 Article 36, as the 
Court interpreted it, requires rules the rules for military tribunals to be the same as the rules for 
courts martial to the extent practicable.86 Although the President had determined that it would 
be impracticable to have the military tribunals operate under the same rules as do courts 
martial, the Court found that determination "insufficient."87 Second, the Court found that the 
President's rules for military tribunals violated UCMJ Article 21.  Article 21 requires the rules for 
military tribunals to comply with "the law of war."88 The Court determined that the tribunals' 
rules violated the Geneva Conventions, which the government conceded are part of "the law of 
war."89 In short, the Court invalidated the President's rules because they conflicted with an Act 
of Congress. 
 Some early commentators believe that Hamdan casts serious doubt on the legality of the 
NSA surveillance program because that program, like the President's rules for tribunals, violates 
an Act of Congress: namely, the FISA.90 The provisions of the UCMJ at issue in Hamdan,
however, unlike the FISA provisions with which the NSA surveillance program conflicts, were 
not challenged by the government as unconstitutionally infringing on the President's inherent 
powers.  As Justice Thomas noted in his Hamdan dissent, the Court did not need to decide the 
President has inherent authority to use military tribunals to try suspected terrorists.91 The issue 
before the Court was whether the President's action fell within "certain statutes, duly enacted by 
 
85 Id. at 2790 (discussing Art. 36 of UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 836). 
86 Id. at 2790-93. 
87 Id. at 2791. 
88 Id. at 2794 (discussing Article 21 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 821). 
89 Id. at 2794. 
90 See Editorial, Who Watches Those Who Watch Us?, NW. FLA. (FORT WALTON BEACH) DAILY NEWS, July 
26, 2006, (quoting interview in which Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of Electronic Privacy 
Information Center, states that Hamdan "told the executive branch that it doesn't have unlimited power 
under the Constitution to do whatever it thinks is necessary, even in times of war," and arguing that the 
decision dampens congressional enthusiasm for legislation authorizing NSA surveillance program); Letter 
from Jerrold Nadler, Member of U.S. House of Representatives, to Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Attorney 
General (July 26, 2006) (stating that Court's decision in Hamdan makes it untenable for President to rely 
on inherent powers to justify NSA surveillance program), available at 7/26/06 USFEDNEWS (Westlaw). 
91 Id. at 2825 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Congress … in the proper exercise of its powers as an independent branch of government."92
Perhaps the government did not challenge the UCMJ provisions at issue in Hamdan because 
they leave room for the President to act as necessary in genuine national security emergencies.  
UCMJ Article 36 authorizes the President, when establishing military tribunals, to depart from 
the rules for courts martial if it is "impracticable" to use identical rules.93 UCMJ Article 21 
obligates the President to follow the "laws of war" in the use of military tribunals, but the laws of 
war, in turn, authorize the use of military tribunals "in cases of 'controlling necessity.'"94 Thus, 
both statutory provisions arguably reflect that as necessary in exigent circumstances the 
President has authority to depart from their otherwise applicable strictures. 
 Recognizing a congressionally irreducible "genuine emergency" power in the President 
is supported by the Constitution's creation of a "unitary executive."95 The Constitution provided 
for only one president so, in appropriate occasions, someone can act for the nation without 
consulting others.96 The Framers thought a unitary executive was particularly important for 
conducting foreign affairs.  A unitary executive not only enables the country to speak to other 
countries with one voice.97 It also ensures quick action when necessary to protect national 
security.98 Too, it helps ensure the secrecy of sensitive foreign intelligence.99 Thus, the Court 
 
92 Id. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
93 10 U.S.C. § 836. 
94 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 139-40 (1866), and explaining 
that the law of war, as described in Milligan, was initially codified in UCMJ Article 15 and later in UCMJ 
Article 21); see also Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2785 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (referring to the "inability on the 
Executive's part here to satisfy the most basic precondition -- at least in the absence of specific 
congressional authorization -- for establishment of military commissions: military necessity"). 
95 See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712-13 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(discussing unitary executive); THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton)  (Benjamin Fletcher 
Wright ed. 1961) ("Decision, activity, secrecy, and d[i]spatch will generally characterize the proceedings 
of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number."); Christopher 
S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-
2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2005). 
96 See 10 ANNALS CONG. 613 (1800) (argument of John Marshall that "the President is the sole organ of 
the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations"). 
97 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 220 ("The President is the constitutional representative of the United States 
with regard to foreign nations.") (quoting 8 U.S. Senate Reports Comm. On Foreign Relations 24 (Feb. 
15, 1816). 
98 See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note __, at  451-52 ("Energy in the executive … is essential to the 
protection of the community against foreign attacks," and an ingredient of energy is "unity"); see also 
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has often referred to the President as the "sole organ" of foreign affairs.100 The "sole organ" 
concept cannot, however, be stretched so far that it puts the President indefinitely above the 
law.  Rather, it makes sense to let the President act as the "sole organ" if -- but only so long as -
- it is necessary in a genuine national security emergency for him or her to so function.101 
This conclusion leaves many questions unanswered.  They include the questions of who 
decides whether a national security emergency exists and what response is appropriate.102 As 
a practical matter, the President initially must decide those questions.103 Courts, however, can 
often review those decisions when they are implemented by officials other than the President 
 
LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 6 (1995) (explaining that Framers believed President should 
have power to repel foreign attacks without congressional approval partly because Congress was 
expected to meet only about once a year). 
99 See Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) ("The President, both 
as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services 
whose reports are not and ought not to be published to the world."); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 
("Secrecy in respect of information gathered by [President's "confidential sources of information"] may be 
highly necessary [in the "field of international relations"] and the premature disclosure of it productive of 
harmful results"); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 5-7, 200-01 (Randall W. Bland 
et al. eds. 5th ed. 1984) (citing among President's advantages over Congress in the conduct of foreign 
policy the unitary nature of the Presidency, its ability to collect and maintain secrecy of relevant 
information, and to act quickly); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay), supra note __, at 422 (many 
who provide useful intelligence related to treaties "would rely on the secrecy of the President" but not on 
that of the Senate or House of Representatives, and therefore Constitution's framers wisely provide that 
President "will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may 
suggest") (quoted in Robert F. Turner, Op-Ed, FISA vs. the Constitution, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2005, at 
A14. 
100 Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 369 (2005) ("In our system of government, the Executive 
is 'the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations… .'") (quoting Curtiss-
Wright, 299 U.S. at 320); see also Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) ("[T]he 
historical gloss on the 'executive Power' vested in Article II of the constitution has recognized the 
president's 'vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.'") (quoting Youngstown,
343 U.S. at 610-11 (1952)); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 125 
L.Ed.2d 128 (1993)  (President has "unique responsibility" for the conduct of "foreign and military affairs"); 
First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 769 (1972) (plurality opinion) (President 
has "the lead role … in foreign policy"). 
101 Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257, 1257-58 
(2004) (arguing for recognition of a constitutional principle of necessity that can even "trump specific 
constitutional requirements" if necessary to "national self-preservation"). 
102 Cf. Paulsen, supra note __, at 1289-96 (discussing standard and identity of decision maker for 
proposed constitutional principle of necessity). 
103 See Martin, 25 U.S. at 31 (in determining whether to call up the state militia pursuant to statutory and 
constitutional authority, the President "is necessarily constituted the judge of the existence of the 
exigency in the first instance, and is bound to act according to his belief of the facts"). 
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and affect individual rights.104 Indeed, sometimes the federal courts can set aside such 
decisions, as the Court's recent decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld shows.105 Thus, regardless of 
the power the President may individually possess as a "unitary executive," he is judicially 
accountable in many settings.  In addition to being judicially accountable, the President is 
politically accountable for his or her unilateral responses to genuine national security 
emergencies, at least once those decisions become public.106 
By any standard, 9/11 constituted a genuine national security emergency.107 It 
accordingly empowered the President to take some immediate actions that he reasonably 
thought necessary, even if those actions violated federal statutes.  Suppose, for example, that 
the passengers aboard United Airlines Flight 93 had not caused the plane to crash in 
Shanksville, Pennsylvania, and that it had continued its suicide mission toward the U.S. 
Capitol.108 Can anyone doubt that the President could have ordered the flight shot down before 
it hit the Capitol, even if that order violated a federal statute?109 Similarly, suppose the 
President had ordered the instant electronic monitoring of all cell phone calls to and from the 
 
104 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 591 (Court reviewed Executive Order that recited existence of an 
"emergency" that required takeover of the nation's steel mills); see also Alderman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 165, 176-85 (1969) (prescribing standards and procedures by which criminal defendant could 
identify and seek suppression of evidence gathered through electronic surveillance for national security 
purposes); cf. Martin, 25 U.S. at 32-33 (rejecting the argument that court could try the facts underlying 
President's determination that emergency existed justifying the call up of the militia); Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. 137, 169-172 (1803) (concluding that mandamus would lie to order head of federal government 
department to take action compelled by law, where failure to take the action injured individual's vested 
legal rights). 
105 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006)  
106 See Martin, 25 U.S. at 32 (danger of President's abusing statutory and constitutional authority to call 
up the militia in times of emergency lay in "the frequency of elections, and the watchfulness of the 
representatives of the nation," which "carry with them all the checks which can be useful to guard against 
usurpation or wanton tyranny"). 
107 See Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks, 66 Fed Reg. 48,199 
(Sept. 14, 2001) (presidential declaration of emergency). 
108 See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS 
UPON THE UNITED STATES 10-14 (2004) (describing events leading to the crash of United Airlines Flight 
93). 
109 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note __, at 37, 45 (discussing contingent "shootdown order" 
issued for Flight 93). 
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plane to determine the plane's target and those responsible for the suicide mission.  Would not 
the President have authority to order that surveillance even if it violated FISA?110 
One basis for concluding that the President would have that authority is to interpret FISA 
(and other statutes limiting the President's power in genuine emergencies) implicitly to include 
exceptions for genuine emergencies.  That interpretation finds support in the canon requiring 
courts to avoid statutory interpretations that produce "absurd results."111 But the canon should 
not obscure the reason why it would be absurd to interpret FISA to prohibit the President from 
responding to genuine national security emergencies:  It is absurd to give Congress such a 
prohibitory power.  To the contrary, common sense and precedent support recognition of 
presidential power, irreducible by Congress, to make necessary, immediate responses to 
genuine national security emergencies. 
 Of course, the President's "genuine emergency" power has limits.  The Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor created a "genuine emergency," but that emergency did not last for the entire 
war.112 Nor did the attack on Pearl Harbor necessarily justify every measure that the President 
deemed reasonable, including the mass internment of Japanese Americans.113 The existence 
 
110 Cf. Senate Hearing of Feb. 28, 2006, supra note __, at __ (testimony of former CIA Director James 
Woolsey) (stating that President's "inherent authority" justifies NSA surveillance program "because the 
country has been invaded -- albeit, of course, not occupied -- and defending against invasion was at the 
heart of the president's Article 2 authority for the founders"). 
111 See, e.g., Clinton, 524 U.S. at 429.  Supporting the interpretation described in the text is a statement 
by then-Attorney General Griffin Bell that the bill enacted as FISA "does not take away the power [of] the 
President under the Constitution.” Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearings on 
H.R.5764,  H.R. 9745, H.R. 7308, and H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the House 
Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 15 (1978). 
112 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 80 (1866) ("As necessity creates the rule [allowing military tribunals 
to serve the function of civil courts when the latter are closed due to foreign invasion or civil war], so it 
limits its duration."); id. at 127 (martial law justified only by "actual and present" necessity as in a genuine 
invasion that closes civilian courts); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 113 (1943) 
(Murphy, J., concurring) ("[T]he military arm, confronted with the peril of imminent enemy attack and 
acting under the authority conferred by Congress, made an allowable judgment at the time the curfew 
restriction [upon Japanese Americans living in certain areas of the West Coast] was imposed.  Whether 
such a restriction is valid today is another matter."). 
113 See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 102 (upholding executive order, ratified by Congress, imposing curfew 
on Japanese Americans in certain areas during World War II, while emphasizing that other wartime 
measures affecting Japanese Americans (such as internment) were not before the Court); see also 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1945) (upholding Executive Order excluding 
Japanese Americans from certain areas). 
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of genuine emergency powers in the President -- and the relaxation of Bill-of-Rights limits on 
those powers -- must be limited in time and scope.114 Otherwise, the separation of powers 
system cannot work effectively and Bill of Rights freedoms become fair weather friends.  I 
propose two limits on the President's "genuine emergency" powers.   
 First, the President's power depends on the legislative framework within which it is 
exercised.  The President can defy an Act of Congress in a national security emergency only if 
defiance of the legislation is necessary to respond to the emergency.  If the President can 
effectively respond to the emergency while obeying the statute, the President lacks power to 
defy it.115 Thus, Congress can regulate the President's power to respond to national security 
emergencies by enacting legislation that gives the President adequate leeway in such 
emergencies.  By the same token, it is the inadequacy of legislation that justifies presidential 
defiance of the legislation in cases of genuine emergency.116 
Second, the President's emergency powers are residual when Congress has enacted 
generally valid legislation in the same area.  Congress and the President share power in many 
 
114 Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("The judicial test of 
whether the Government, on a plea of military necessity, can validly deprive an individual of any of his 
constitutional rights is whether the deprivation is reasonably related to a public danger that is so 
'immediate, imminent, and impending' as not to admit of delay and not to permit the intervention of 
ordinary constitutional processes to alleviate the danger."). 
115 The President has claimed that the NSA surveillance program is "crucial to our national security."  
Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, to Sen. Pat Roberts et al. 1 (Dec. 22, 2005) ("The President has stated that these activities are 
'crucial to our national security.'"), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj122205.pdf.  The 
President has not  (publicly, at least) shown why it is necessary to ignore FISA in conducting that 
program. 
116 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, 
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 92 (1976) (testimony 
of Attorney General Edward H. Levi) ("[]W]hen a statute prescribes a method of domestic [surveillance] 
action adequate to the President's duty to protect the national security, the President is legally obliged to 
follow it.") (emphasis added); see also Senate Hearing of Mar. 28, 2006, supra note __, at __ (prepared 
statement of David S. Kris, Senior Vice President, Time Warner, Inc.) (separation of powers analysis of 
NSA program will depend partly on "the [executive branch's] need to eschew the use of FISA in obtaining" 
needed information); cf. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 58 & 60 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(stating that federal courts have inherent and congressionally "indefeasible" power to "do what courts 
have traditionally done in order to accomplish their assigned tasks," and, while Congress "may to some 
degree" prescribe the means for exercising that power, courts can ignore the prescribed congressionally 
prescribed means if those means are inadequate); id. at 65 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (positing a similar 
"necessity limitation" on federal courts' exercise of congressionally irreducible inherent powers). 
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areas, including the waging of war.117 In matters of shared governance, the separation of 
powers doctrine gives Congress the power to make rules and the President power -- not to 
unmake Congress's rules -- but to break them when reasonably necessary in a genuine 
emergency.  For example, in late 2005 Congress enacted a law prohibiting members of the 
armed forces from torturing people detained in the war on terrorism.118 Assume for the sake of 
argument that it is possible to conceive of a "genuine emergency" in which the President could 
reasonably decide it was necessary to defy this prohibition.119 It is one thing to recognize 
presidential power to break Congress's rule in a particularly exigent situation, after making an 
individualized determination that it was necessary to violate the prohibition.  It is quite a different 
matter to recognize presidential power to unmake Congress's rule by promulgating a "program" 
authorizing torture in broadly defined categories of situations.120 One way to express the 
difference is by saying that, in the second situation, the President is impermissibly exercising 
legislative power, whereas in the first situation he is exercising irreducible executive power.121 
117 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773 (discussing Constitution's grants of war powers to President and 
Congress); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93 ("[T]he Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress 
the exercise of the war power… ."); see also, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, 126 S. 
Ct. 1297, 1306 (2006) (("'[J]udicial deference … is at its apogee' when Congress legislates under its 
authority to raise and support armies.") (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)). 
118 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 (Dec. 30, 2005) 
("No individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless 
of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment."). 
119 To be clear, I am indeed staking out the position that the President has power to ignore anti-torture 
legislation when reasonably necessary to respond to a genuine national security emergency.  Although 
the President's power in this regard is not congressionally irreducible, it is, of course, subject to 
constitutional restrictions, such as those imposed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments.  See 
Richard H. Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS L.J. ___ (forthcoming summer 2006) (discussing 
constitutional limits on government's power to torture suspected terrorists); see also Paulsen, supra note 
__, at 1280 (taking a similar position).  Furthermore, even if Congress lacks power to prohibit executive 
branch torture in certain situations, Congress might have power to exclude evidence derived from that 
torture in federal courts.  See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 55 (1992) (stating in dicta that 
Congress could require disclosure to criminal defendants of exculpatory evidence presented to the grand 
jury, even if Constitution did not require disclosure). 
120 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 ("[T]he President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed 
refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."). 
121 The President's power in the legislative process, as specifically prescribed in the Constitution, includes 
recommending legislation to Congress.  Certainly the President could have done so in the 4 year since 
first authorizing the NSA program.  See Dan Eggen, 2003 Draft Legislation Covered Eavesdropping,
Wash. Post, Jan. 28, 2006, at A2 (observing that Department of Justice drafted legislation in 2003 to 
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Another way to express the difference is to say that the executive power to act in "emergencies" 
is limited in scope and duration to that necessary when there is "no time for deliberation."122 
Those limits flow from our system of separated powers. 
 B.  Fourth Amendment Constraints on Presidential Powers in a "Genuine Emergency" 
 The hypothetical surveillance order described above, covering all cell phone calls to and 
from the doomed Flight 93, falls not only within the intrinsic limits of the President's powers 
under Article II but also within the extrinsic limits imposed by the Fourth Amendment.123 
Ordinarily, the Fourth Amendment requires the government to get a warrant before 
electronically intercepting phone calls.124 In addition, the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires 
a particularized showing that the monitoring of each phone user is likely to reveal evidence of 
 
amend Patriot Act but, according to Justice Department officials, the draft legislation did not address the 
NSA program). 
122 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 552; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 28-29, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-
6696) (Justice Souter remarks, "[I]t may well be that the executive has power in the early exigencies of an 
emergency.  But that at some point in the indefinite future, the other political branch has got to act if that 
… power is to continue."); JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 5-9 (1993) (proposing that, in response to sudden attack, President can 
respond without congressional authorization if he seeks such authorization simultaneously); William C. 
Bradford, "The Duty to Defend Them: A Natural Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War,
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1448 (2004) ("[I]n the event of an invasion or other imminent harm against 
U.S. citizens or property, inherent presidential powers of self-defense -- for the exercise of which the 
President need neither seek nor receive congressional authorization -- are triggered, even if the President 
remains obligated to make a subsequent request for congressional authorization for his course of 
action.") (footnote omitted); John W. Dean, George W. Bush as the New Richard M. Nixon: Both 
Wiretapped Illegally, and Impeachably; Both Claimed That a President May Violate Congress' Laws to 
Protect National Security, FindLaw (Dec. 30, 2005) (stating that NSA surveillance program might have 
been justified "as a temporary measure" or in response to "a particularly serious threat of attack," but 
program is not justified considering all of the time that President has had, and not used, "to seek legal 
authority for his action" from Congress), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20051230.html; cf. Mitchell v. 
Harmony, 54 U.S. 115 134 (1851) (for military to have power to take private property for military use, "the 
danger must be immediate and impending; or the necessity urgent for the public service, such as will not 
admit of delay, and where the action of the civil authority would be too late in providing the means which 
the occasion calls for"). 
123 See generally, e.g., David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial 
Branch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 79 ("Intrinsic limits derive from the principle of enumerated powers."); id. at 
153 (describing Bill of Rights as containing "extrinsic limits").   
124 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 758 (1971) ("We held in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 ... 
[(1967)] that wiretapping is a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and 
therefore must meet its requirements, viz., there must be a prior showing of probable cause, the warrant 
authorizing the wiretap must particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized, and that it may not have the breadth, generality, and long life of the general warrant against 
which the Fourth Amendment was aimed.") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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crime.125 The traditional Fourth Amendment requirements of a warrant and an individualized 
showing of probable cause for a search do not, however, apply to our Flight 93 scenario.  The 
exigent circumstances doctrine of Fourth Amendment law justifies immediate, warrantless 
surveillance of all cell phone users on board the flight.126 Moreover, although the exigent 
circumstances doctrine normally requires a particularized showing of probable cause of criminal 
activity,127 that showing is unnecessary when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement," makes the probable cause requirement impracticable.128 The Flight 93 scenario 
 
125 See id.
126 See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (holding that police's warrantless entry into 
home and search for bank robber did not violate the Fourth Amendment because "the exigencies of the 
situation made that course imperative") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Georgia v. Randolph, 
126 S. Ct. 1515, 1524 n.6 (2006) (stating in dicta that exigent circumstances would justify police's entry 
into a house, over the objection of a co-tenant, when necessary to preserve evidence or in other 
circumstances); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 649-50 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (plurality opinion of 
Wright, J., joined by Chief Judges Bazelon and Circuit Judges Leventhal and Spottswood W. Robinson, 
III) (finding that exigent circumstances doctrine would allow warrantless electronic surveillance when 
delay would cause "disastrous harm to the national security") 
127 See, e.g., Hayden, 387 U.S. at 307. 
128 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 
(1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)).  As the text indicates, the exigent circumstances doctrine 
and the "special needs" doctrine sometimes overlap.  The overlap occurs when exigent circumstances, 
such as those associated with national security emergencies, trigger a "special need" for searches and 
seizures beyond that associated with ordinary law enforcement.  Two recent Supreme Court cases 
confirm the overlap.  In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000), the Supreme Court relied 
on the exigent circumstances doctrine in stating that "the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly 
permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a 
dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route."  The Court explained that each of 
these situations would involve an "emergency" that would cause the "primary purpose" of such a 
roadblock no longer to be merely "ordinary crime control."  Id.; see also id. (stating that the "exigencies 
created by" the terrorist scenario "are far removed from the circumstances under which authorities might 
simply stop cars as a matter of course to see if there just happens to be a felon leaving the jurisdiction").  
In support of that dicta, the Court cited the decision of the court of appeals in Edmond, which had 
endorsed roadblocks for similar purposes but relied, not on the exigent circumstances doctrine, but on the 
"special needs" doctrine of Fourth Amendment law.  See Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 662-63 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (cited in Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44).  We see similar blending of the exigent circumstances 
doctrine and the special needs doctrine in dissenting opinions in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).  
The majority in Caballes held that the use of a narcotics-detection dog during a traffic stop did not 
constitute a "search" or "seizure" subject to the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 407-10. In dissent, Justice 
Souter said that he "would treat the dog sniff" as a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 842-
43 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Justice Souter noted, however -- in discussing the government's "authority to 
detect explosives and dangerous chemical or biological weapons that might be carried by a terrorist who 
prompts no individualized suspicion" -- that "[u]nreasonable sniff searches for marijuana are not 
necessarily unreasonable sniff searches for destructive or deadly material if suicide bombs are a risk."  Id. 
at 843 n.7.  Justice Souter did not identify what Fourth Amendment doctrine supported the 
reasonableness of sniff searches for suicide bombs.  Fellow dissenter Justice Ginsburg, however, 
identified the special needs doctrine as supporting both the suicide-bomb scenario described by Justice 
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thus illustrates the overlap between the President's congressionally irreducible, intrinsic power 
under Article II to respond to genuine national security emergencies and extrinsic limits on that 
power imposed by the Fourth Amendment.  In a "genuine emergency," the President can take 
immediate action reasonably necessary to protect national security -- even if the action violates 
statutory restrictions -- and, if the President's action entails a search or seizure (as does 
presidentially authorized electronic surveillance), exigent circumstances will often excuse 
ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements.  In short, the President's power reasonably to 
respond to a genuine national security emergency not only is irreducible by Congress but also 
satisfies the Fourth Amendment -- even if the response entails warrantless, suspicionless 
searches and seizures -- as long as that response is reasonably justified by the emergency.129 
The overlap between separation of powers limits and Fourth Amendment limits on the 
President's power in the Flight 93 scenario is not happenstance.  Rather, it reflects an overlap 
 
Souter and the terrorist scenario described by the majority (and justified using the exigent circumstances 
doctrine) in Edmond. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 424-25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Kia P. v. 
McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 762 (2nd Cir. 2000) (holding that state's seizure of a child in order to prevent 
suspected abuse or neglect could be justified under either the special needs or the exigent circumstances 
doctrine).  In the absence of a genuine national security exigency, even routine protection of national 
security may justify some types of special needs searches, including ones that occur at the border.  See 
United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (warrantless, suspicionless border searches 
supported by "the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself") (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 
431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977)); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (border 
searches supported by "Congress' power to protect the nation"); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 
154 (1925) ("Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self 
protection… .").  Without extended discussion, I would only note that, in my view, neither the special 
needs doctrine nor the border search doctrine, standing alone, support the current NSA surveillance 
program as a whole.  The special needs doctrine does not work because of the scope and intrusiveness 
of the surveillance program; if it passes muster under special needs analysis, just about anything goes -- 
the Fourth Amendment would be gutted.  Essentially the same analysis precludes reliance on the border 
search doctrine.  The NSA surveillance program monitors calls and emails between foreign countries and 
places throughout the United States.  Because the surveillance blankets this country, if it is treated as 
occurring at the border or its "functional equivalent," the border search doctrine would decimate the 
Fourth Amendment.  See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973) (stating that 
border searches "may in certain circumstances take place not only at the border itself, but at its functional 
equivalent as well," such as "a search of the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis 
airport after a nonstop flight from Mexico City"); see also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 892-93 
(1975) (government did not attempt to treat search occurring at fixed checkpoint more than 60 miles from 
the border as occurring at the "functional equivalent" of the border). 
129 As Chris Slobogin has pointed out, the term "suspicionless" is often used imprecisely to refer to 
situations that are, in fact, suspicious but that may not involve suspicion associated with any particular 
individual.  See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 57, 
81-85 (1991). 
32
between the separation of powers doctrine and Fourth Amendment doctrine.130 Our system of 
separated powers provides a unitary executive to encourage prompt and focused exercises of 
executive power, especially in foreign affairs.131 Yet to prevent abuses of executive power, 
separation of powers requires the President to obey limits imposed in statutes enacted by 
Congress (while acting within its powers) and in judgments entered by the federal courts (while 
acting within their powers).  The Fourth Amendment, like the separation of powers doctrine, is 
designed to prevent abuses of power by any of the three branches.  Thus, both the separation 
of powers and the Fourth Amendment are power-limiting provisions neither of which speaks in 
absolutes.  In a genuine national security emergency, the President needs some room to act 
unilaterally -- even in defiance of congressional restrictions -- and without the usual Fourth 
Amendment constraints.  Recognition of this unilateral emergency power reflects that neither 
the separation of powers doctrine nor the Fourth Amendment operates as a "suicide pact."132 
As is true of presidential power to ignore generally valid statutes, presidential power to 
act free of ordinary Fourth Amendment constraints has limits.  Specifically, a search that is 
 
130 See Keith, 407 U.S. at 317 (the Fourth Amendment principle that generally requires advance judicial 
approval of searches "accords with our basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be 
preserved through a separation of powers"); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, (1967) 
(Douglas, J. concurring) ("In matters where [the President or Attorney General] believe national security 
may be involved they are not detached, disinterested, and neutral as a court or magistrate must be.  
Under the separation of powers …, the Executive Branch is not supposed to be neutral and 
disinterested… I cannot agree that where spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection of Fourth 
Amendment rights is assured when the President and Attorney General assume both the position of 
adversary-and-prosecutor and disinterested, neutral magistrate."); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' 
Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 
1342 (2002) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment and the doctrine of separation of powers share the same goal 
and are intended to serve the same function" -- namely, "to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power."); cf. 
Timothy Lynch, In Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 711, 737 (2000) (arguing 
that "[t]he exclusionary rule can be justified on the basis of separation of powers principles"). 
131 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text 
132 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).  On this same "Constitution is not a suicide 
pact" principle, one can imagine other instances -- besides the exigent circumstances situation -- in which 
the President might have plenary power to act free of statutory limitations and, at the same time, free of 
ordinary constitutional constraints.  I thank David Kris for this point.  See E-mail from David S. Kris, Senior 
Vice-President & Deputy General Counsel and Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer, Time Warner, Inc., 
to Richard Henry Seamon, Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law (July 12, 2006 8:49 AM) 
(on file with author);  see also Paulsen, supra note __, at 1257 (proposing an "overriding principle of 
constitutional and national self-preservation that operates as a meta-rule of construction and that may 
even, in cases of extraordinary necessity, trump specific constitutional requirements"). 
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justified at its inception by exigent circumstances violates the Fourth Amendment if conducted in 
a way that is not reasonably related to the circumstances that justified it in the first place.133 And 
so, police officers who enter a house without a warrant to help a shooting victim cannot stay in 
the house to search for evidence of crime after they have rendered the help.134 Likewise, a wide 
scale surveillance program that violates an existing statute but that is justified by a national 
emergency such as 9/11 becomes unjustified as days and weeks pass without further attacks 
and give the executive branch an opportunity to have Congress consider whether to amend the 
statute to allow the program.135 
C. Summary 
 I want to summarize by emphasizing the limited nature of my claim.  I claim that 
precedent suggests that the President has congressionally irreducible power to respond 
reasonably to respond to genuine national security emergencies.  Precedent is suggestive but 
not conclusive on the existence of this plenary power.  Equally important, the precedent 
suggests the President's "genuine emergency" powers, if any, are limited in scope and duration 
when Congress has legislated on a matter as to which it and the President share power.  In their 
interstitial nature, the President's powers resemble, and indeed often parallel, the government's 
 
133 See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) ('[A] warrantless 
search must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation ….") (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
134 See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 (approving lower court cases holding that "the Fourth Amendment does 
not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a 
person within is in need of immediate aid," but these holdings did not justify four-day search of murder 
scene that occurred in the case before the Court). 
135 In commenting on a draft of this article, Louis Fisher asked the fair question how long after 9/11 the 
President's power to defy FISA lasted.  E-mail from Louis Fisher, supra note __.   Lincoln acted in April 
1861 and didn't address Congress until it returned several months later.  He notes that, when President 
Lincoln waited until several months after Congress returned from recess to seek legislation authorizing 
Lincoln's emergency actions (including suspension of the writ of habeas corpus) in April 1861.  Id.; see 
also Fisher, supra note __, at 260-61.  I agree with the standard that Dr. Fisher proposes: When 
Congress is in session, the President must go to Congress as soon as possible.  In the case of 9/11, that 
date came less than one week after 9/11, for that is how quickly the Administration was able to draft and 
present to Congress the bill later enacted as the Patriot Act.  See 9/11 REPORT, supra note __, at 328; 
see also Administration's Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the Judiciary Comm. of the 
House of Representatives, 107th Cong. 67-90 (Sept. 24, 2001) (reproducing Administration's proposed 
bill). 
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power under "exigent circumstances" to conduct searches and seizures free from the traditional 
Fourth Amendment requirements of a warrant and individualized probable cause.136 The 
parallel reflects the pragmatic balance between strong executive power and safeguards against 
executive abuses that underlie both separation of powers doctrine and Fourth Amendment 
doctrine. 
III. Analysis of the NSA Program As an Exercise of the President's Genuine National  
 Security Emergency Powers 
 A. Whether the NSA Program Falls Within the President's Power Even Though the  
 Program Violates FISA  
 As discussed above, precedent suggests that the President has congressionally 
irreducible power to take immediate action reasonably necessary to respond to a genuine 
national security emergency; that power is limited, however, by the legislative framework within 
which it is exercised and by its exigent nature.  The current NSA program exceeds those limits. 
 Let us assume that in the days and weeks after the 9/11 attacks the President could 
have established a "program" of domestic, electronic surveillance outside FISA.  The 
President's power to maintain such a program, which violated a facially valid statute, subsided 
as weeks passed without further attacks and provided "time for deliberation"137 within a system 
of civilian government that continued to function.138 Indeed, deliberations on appropriate 
responses to 9/11 did occur within and among the executive branch and Congress.  The result 
was enactment of the PATRIOT Act, which expanded surveillance power by, among other 
 
136 Thus, I am not making the argument that a court recently understood the government to be making in 
defense of the NSA program; I do not argue that the President "has been granted the inherent power to 
violate not only the laws of the Congress but [also] the … Fourth Amendment."  ACLU v. NSA, 2006 WL 
2371463, at *25. 
137 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 552. 
138 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 80 (1866) (stating that military tribunals could "furnish a substitute for the 
civil authority" if "in foreign invasion or civil war, the [civil] courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to 
administer criminal justice according to law"); cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (2006) 
(opinion of Breyer, J., concurring) (rejecting dissent's argument that Court's decision invalidating 
Presidential order establishing military tribunals threatened national security: "Where, as here, no 
emergency prevents consultation with Congress, judicial insistence upon that consultation does not 
weaken our Nation's ability to deal with danger."). 
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changes, amendments to FISA.139 It is hard for the President to argue it was reasonably 
necessary to establish a far-ranging surveillance "program" in defiance of FISA when the 
President did not first attempt to change FISA to avoid the need to violate that statute.140 
True, FISA has shortcomings.  The shortcomings reflect changes in surveillance 
technology and in international terrorism.  Those shortcomings could very well justify 
surveillance outside FISA -- even today -- if the President reasonably determines that, in a 
particular instance, it is reasonably necessary to depart from FISA.  Specifically, FISA may have 
three shortcomings that could create "genuine emergencies" justifying event-specific departures 
from FISA.  
 First, it may take too long to get a FISA surveillance order.141 True, the Attorney General 
can authorize "emergency orders" approving FISA surveillance without prior court approval.142 
139 United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 206-208, 214, 215, 218 & 225, 115 Stat. 272, 282-83, 287-
88, 291, 295-96 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
140 See supra note __ and accompanying text (arguing that President had power to act only while there 
was no time for deliberation).  One argument that the President has made is that the terrorists might have 
been alerted if the President had consulted with Congress about the NSA surveillance program.  This 
argument is difficult to analyze because so little relevant information is publicly available.  I do not wish to 
reject the argument out of hand, however. 
141 The DOJ White Paper, supra note __, at 18, summarizes the typical FISA process: 
 
As a general matter, the statute requires that the Attorney General approve an 
application for an order from a special court composed of Article III judges and created by 
FISA—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”). See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803- 
1804. The application must demonstrate, among other things, that there is probable 
cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. See id. 
§ 1805(a)(3)(A). It must also contain a certification from the Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs or an officer of the United States appointed by the President with 
the advice and consent of the Senate and having responsibilities in the area of national 
security or defense that the information sought is foreign intelligence information and 
cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative means. See id. § 1804(a)(7). 
FISA further requires the Government to state the means that it proposes to use to obtain 
the information and the basis for its belief that the facilities at which the surveillance will 
be directed are being used or are about to be used by a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power. See id. § 1804(a)(4), (a)(8). 
 
142 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f) ("Emergency orders") provides in relevant part: 
 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, when the Attorney General 
reasonably determines that --  
 
36
But this statutory emergency authority has drawbacks.  The Attorney General must personally 
determine the existence of both an emergency exists and that the factual basis for the issuance 
of an orders.143 Until he or she does so, emergency surveillance cannot occur.144 NSA, 
however, may need to start surveillance the instant that NSA determines the surveillance is 
justified, without waiting for Attorney General authorization.145 Furthermore, the Attorney 
General is only one person, and he or she may be called upon personally and very quickly to 
make dozens or hundreds of "emergency" determinations.  The Attorney General could become 
a bottleneck.  Finally, the government must advise the FISA court of each emergency order and 
apply within 72 hours for a surveillance order from the court to ratify the attorney general's 
 
(1) an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment of electronic 
surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information before an order authorizing such 
surveillance can with due diligence be obtained; and  
(2) the factual basis for issuance of an order under this subchapter to approve such 
surveillance exists; 
 
he may authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance is a judge having 
jurisdiction under section 1803 of this title is informed by the Attorney General or his 
designee at the time of such authorization that the decision has been made to employ 
emergency electronic surveillance and if an application in accordance with this 
subchapter is made to that judge as soon as practicable, but not more than 72 hours after 
the Attorney General authorizes such surveillance. If the Attorney General authorizes 
such emergency employment of electronic surveillance, he shall require that the 
minimization procedures required by this subchapter for the issuance of a judicial order 
be followed. In the absence of a judicial order approving such electronic surveillance, the 
surveillance shall terminate when the information sought is obtained, when the 
application for the order is denied, or after the expiration of 72 hours from the time of 
authorization by the Attorney General, whichever is earliest. 
.
143 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f)(1) & (2); Moschella Letter of Mar. 24, 2006, supra note __, encl. at 12 (stating that 
Attorney General must "personally" determine that factual basis for emergency FISA surveillance exists). 
144 See Moschella Letter of Mar. 24, 2006, supra note __, encl. at  39 ("[A]s a practical matter, it is 
necessary for NSA intelligence officers, NSA lawyers, Justice Department lawyers, and the Attorney 
General to review a matter before even emergency surveillance would begin."). 
145 See Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared Remarks at the Georgetown University Law Center (Jan. 24, 
2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_0601241.html: 
 
[T]he optimal way to achieve the necessary speed and agility is to leave the decisions 
about particular intercepts to the judgment of professional intelligence officers, based on 
the best available intelligence information. They can make that call quickly. If, however, 
those same intelligence officers had to navigate through the FISA process for each of 
these intercepts, that would necessarily introduce a significant factor of DELAY, and 
there would be critical holes in our early warning system. 
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emergency order.146 This supposedly expedited application process, required for every 
emergency order, could keep dozens of government lawyers employed on a continual fire drill 
without coming close to achieving the instantaneous authorization that is sometimes required for 
national security surveillance. 
 Second, the standards for getting FISA surveillance orders may be too high.  NSA 
monitors phone calls and emails into and out of the United States involving people whom NSA 
has a "reasonable basis" for believing are associated with al Qaeda.147 These people may not 
be "agents of foreign power" who can be targeted under FISA.148 Indeed, the person in the 
United States whose phone calls or emails are monitored may be entirely innocent, if it is the 
person outside the U.S. who is associated with al Qaeda and who triggers NSA surveillance.149 
To cite another example, perhaps the person in the U.S. who is being monitored is associated 
with al Qaeda but the association does not make that person a foreign agent.150 Even so, the 
government may have good reason to monitor the communication.   
 
146 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f). 
147 See DOJ White Paper, supra note __, at 5 ("[T]he Attorney General [has] elaborated and explained 
that in order to intercept a communication, there must be 'a reasonable basis to conclude that one party 
to the communication is a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization 
affiliated with al Qaeda.' Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael 
Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html (Dec. 19, 2005) (statement of 
Attorney General Gonzales)."). 
148 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (defining "agent of a foreign power"); see also id. § 1805(a)(3) (requiring judge to 
find "probable cause" that target of proposed FISA surveillance "is a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power"). 
149 Senate Hearing of Feb. 28, 2006, supra note __, at __ (testimony of former CIA Director James 
Woolsey) ("Suppose Al Qaida calls someone in the united States, and it's a false flag operation, and they 
pretend to be Hezbollah to get him to do something.  Are they an agent -- is that probable cause to 
believe they're an agent of Al Qaida?  I don't think so."); Douglas Waller, A Better Way to Eavesdrop?,
TIME, Feb. 2, 2006 (quoting "administration official" as stating that "you have this amorphous group of 
people around the world who are all calling people in the U.S.  You may not know who they're calling in 
the U.S., but you know the person making the call is a bad guy. … But FISA doesn't fit that situation."); 
Richard A. Posner, Wire Trap, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 6, 2006, at 15 (NSA program is apparently designed 
to fill gap left by FISA "by conducting warrantless interceptions of communications in which one party is in 
the United States … and the other party is abroad and suspected of being a terrorist."). 
150 See Seamon & Gardner, supra note __, at 345 (footnotes omitted): 
 
[FISA] classifies a U.S. person as a foreign agent based on their "knowing" involvement, 
"for or on behalf of a foreign power," in (1) "'clandestine intelligence gathering activities' 
[that] involve or may involve violations of Federal criminal law'; (2) "other clandestine 
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Third, FISA orders could be too narrow.  FISA authorizes surveillance of one target at a 
time.151 The government, however, sometimes needs to conduct wholesale surveillance -- for 
example, by monitoring phone calls to all persons in the United States from particular individuals 
outside the U.S.152 Wholesale surveillance may very well violate FISA but be reasonably 
necessary in a genuine national security emergency, such as when the government has strong 
evidence that someone outside the U.S. is planning terrorist attacks on a U.S. target with 
accomplices inside the U.S.153 
intelligence activities," "pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a 
foreign power," "which … involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal 
statutes of the United States"; (3) "sabotage or international terrorism [as defined 
elsewhere in the FISA] … or activities that are in preparation therefore"; (4) entering or 
remaining in the United States "under a false or fraudulent identity" or (5) aiding or 
abetting, or conspiring to engage in, any of the first three categories of activities listed in 
this sentence.  Thus, to find probable cause that a U.S. person is an "agent of a foreign 
power," the judge usually must find evidence of conduct that is a crime or likely to be a 
crime. 
 
See also McCarthy, supra note __, at 90 (referring to the "relatively narrow portion of the overall al 
Qaeda-related communications" covered by FISA); Posner, supra note __, at 16 ("[T]he problem with fisa 
is that the surveillance it authorizes is unusable to discover who is a terrorist, as distinct from 
eavesdropping on known terrorists …. Even to conduct fisa-compliant surveillance of non-U.S. persons, 
you have to know beforehand whether they are agents of a terrorist group, when what you really want to 
know is who those agents are."). 
151 Senate Hearing of Feb. 28, 2006, supra note __, at __ (testimony of former CIA Director James 
Woolsey) ("The one spy at a time surveillance systems of the Cold War, including FISA, through courts, 
are not designed to deal with fast-moving battlefield electronic mapping -- in which an Al Qaida or a 
Hezbollah computer might be captured which contains a large number of e-mail addresses and phone 
numbers which would have to be checked out very promptly.  An attorney general, on a 72-hour basis or 
a FISA court, simply cannot go through the steps that are set out … in time to deal with this type of 
situation"). 
152 See Posner, supra note __, at 16 (surveillance would run up against FISA if government domestically 
monitored all international phone calls to a phone number in the United States that was discovered once 
to have been called by a terrorist suspect abroad, or if government, more broadly, used computers 
domestically to scan all electronic communications for suspicious messages); K. A. Taipale, Whispering 
Wires and Warrantless Wiretaps: Data Mining and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SECURITY, No. VII Supl. Bull. on L. & Sec.: The NSA and the War on Terror, at 4-6 (Spring 2006) 
(discussing need for automated, programmatic surveillance of electronic communications' contents and 
traffic patterns), available at http://whisperingwires.info/. 
153 The government can also avoid FISA by conducting electronic surveillance that falls outside FISA's 
definition of "electronic surveillance."  The definition does not, for example, cover surveillance of a "United 
States person" if the surveillance is conducted outside the United States and does not "intentionally 
target[] that United States person."  50 U.S.C. § 1801(f).  Thus, the government would not be subject to 
FISA if it targeted persons who are located abroad -- even U.S. persons -- if the surveillance occurs 
abroad.   If conducted inside the United States, however, the surveillance would be subject to FISA.  See 
50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(2) (defining "electronic surveillance" to include, with an exception not pertinent here, 
"the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire or 
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In sum, the President may have power to authorize surveillance "outside FISA" in 
situations presenting a "genuine emergency."  That power, however, exists only when national 
security exigencies make it reasonably necessary to ignore FISA.  Even so, the power justifies 
surveillance outside FISA even today, to the extent FISA's shortcomings create exigent 
circumstances precluding resort to the FISA process. This residual power does not support the 
current NSA surveillance "program," which authorizes wholesale departure from FISA.   
 B. Whether the NSA Program Violates the Fourth Amendment  
 Because Surveillance Under the Program Occurs Without a Warrant or  
 Traditional Probable Cause 
 Before Congress enacted FISA in 1978, several lower federal courts upheld warrantless 
electronic surveillance conducted for national security purposes.154 Those courts interpreted the 
Fourth Amendment to create an exception to the warrant requirement for searches conducted 
for foreign intelligence purposes.155 The government has relied on these cases to argue that the 
current NSA program of domestic surveillance does not violate the Fourth Amendment even 
though it occurs without a warrant or probable cause to believe the surveillance will reveal 
evidence of crime.156 Opponents of the current NSA program counter that these cases are 
 
radio communication to or from a person in the United States, without the consent of any party thereto, if 
such acquisition occurs in the United States"); see also NSA Debate: Federalist Society: Rivkin v. Levy 
(posted on Jan. 23, 2006) (remark by David Rivkin), available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/1563282/posts. 
154 Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 742  ("[A]ll the other courts to have decided the issue [have] held that the 
President did have inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence 
information."); see United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he Executive 
Branch need not always obtain a warrant for foreign intelligence surveillance."); United States v. Butenko, 
494 F.2d 593, 606 (3rd Cir. 1974) (en banc) ("[A] warrant prior to a search is not an absolute prerequisite 
in the foreign intelligence field when the President has authorized surveillance"); United States v. Brown, 
484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[T]he President may constitutionally authorize warrantless wiretaps for 
the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence.").  But cf. Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 613-14 (plurality opinion of 
Wright, J.) (stating in dicta, "[A]n analysis of the policies implicated by foreign security surveillance 
indicates that, absent exigent circumstances, all warrantless surveillance is unreasonable and therefore 
unconstitutional."); see also id. at 651 ("[O]ur analysis would suggest that, absent exigent circumstances, 
no wiretapping in the area of foreign affairs should be exempt from prior judicial scrutiny, irrespective of 
the justification for the surveillance or the importance of the information sought."). 
155 See, e.g., Truong, 629 F.2d at 913 ("For several reasons, the needs of the executive are so compelling 
in the area of foreign intelligence … that a uniform warrant requirement would … unduly frustrate the 
President in carrying out his foreign affairs responsibilities.") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
156 See, e.g., DOJ White Paper, supra note __, at 8 ("[E]very federal appellate court to rule on the 
question has concluded that, even in peacetime, the President has inherent constitutional authority, 
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inapposite because they concern surveillance conducted before FISA was enacted.157 Thus, 
the opponents believe that FISA's enactment affects Fourth Amendment analysis.   Neither 
opponents nor supporters of the NSA program, however, elaborate on how FISA affects Fourth 
Amendment analysis.  This portion of the article examines that issue.  I believe that FISA 
influences any Fourth Amendment analysis of the NSA program and should carry particular 
weight in the courts' analysis of the program. 
 First, it changes the legal landscape within which the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness of the NSA program will be judged.158 Prior to FISA, the alternative to 
conducting electronic surveillance for national security purposes without a warrant was to seek 
a warrant for a physical search using the warrant application process used by prosecutors to 
search for evidence of crime.159 That process caused problems because it was designed for 
physical searches, not electronic surveillance, and for criminal investigations, not for national 
security surveillance.160 With the ordinary criminal warrant process as an alternative, 
warrantless national security surveillance might have been reasonable.  Warrantless 
surveillance is not necessarily reasonable when the alternative to it is the FISA process that 
Congress engineered with electronic surveillance and national security in mind.  Thus, 
experience under FISA could establish that the current NSA program is unreasonable, and 
therefore violates the Fourth Amendment, even though the same program might have been 
 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, to conduct searches for foreign intelligence purposes without 
securing a judicial warrant."). 
157 See, e.g., ABA Task Force Report on NSA Surveillance, supra note __, at 13 (observing, in response 
to government's reliance on pre-FISA case law, that "FISA was enacted precisely because, prior to FISA, 
prior presidents had repeatedly abused" their power). 
158 See, e.g., Samson v. California, 2006 WL 1666974 (June 19, 2006) ("[U]nder our general Fourth 
Amendment approach, we examin[e] the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a search is 
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
159 See generally, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 41  (governing process for federal law enforcement officers and 
government attorneys to get search warrants). 
160 See Truong, 629 F.2d at 913-15 (decision involving pre-FISA surveillance holding that "because of the 
need of the executive branch for flexibility, its practical experience, and its constitutional competence, the 
courts should not require the executive to secure a warrant each time it conducts foreign surveillance"); 
Amicus Memo at 42, In re Warrantless Electronic Surveillance, supra note __ (arguing that the concerns 
identified in Truong are largely alleviated by FISA, including its creation of a specialized court with 
procedures for expedited consideration of applications for surveillance orders).  
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reasonable prior to FISA.   In short, determining whether warrantless NSA surveillance is 
reasonable requires a consideration of the alternatives.  FISA has created an alternative that, 
experience show, facilitates the process of getting judicial approval for national security 
surveillance.  Thus, the existence of FISA and experience under the FISA bears on the 
reasonableness of proceeding without resort to that process in somewhat the same way as 
rules authorizing telephonic warrants bears on the reasonableness of police proceeding without 
a warrant.161 
So, too, the existence of FISA bears on Fourth Amendment analysis in essentially the 
same way as it bears on separation of powers analysis.  To the extent that FISA provides a 
process adequate for conducting surveillance in a genuine national security emergency, the 
government's failure to use that process is unreasonable.  To the same extent, the failure to use 
that process cannot be justified by the President's congressionally irreducible power to violate a 
statute when reasonably necessary to respond to a genuine national security emergency.162 
FISA would thus be relevant to any Fourth Amendment analysis of the NSA program.  
For three additional reasons, it deserves particular weight in judicial analysis of the program. 
 First, FISA generally falls within Congress's power to regulate domestic surveillance for 
foreign intelligence information.  That power comes from the Commerce Clause, to the extent 
that the surveillance involves interception of information that travels through channels of 
interstate or foreign commerce such as telephone lines.163 Additional power flows from 
 
161 See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981) (observing that the inconvenience of 
obtaining a warrant to arrest a suspect in a third party's home is "simply not that significant" because of, 
among other reasons, availability of telephonic warrants); cf. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 382 
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[E]ven if a 'frisk' prior to arrest would have been impermissible in 1791 
[when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted], … perhaps it is only since that time that concealed 
weapons capable of harming the interrogator quickly and from beyond arm's reach have become 
common -- which might alter the judgment of what is 'reasonable' under the original standard."). 
162 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
163 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 381-85 (1937) (construing 
federal statute to bar federal agents from divulging communications intercepted by telephone taps; 
supposing that Congress enacted the statute to enforce "the guaranty against practices and procedures 
violative of privacy, embodied in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution"); see also supra 
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congressional powers associated with war and foreign affairs as amplified by the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.164 Indeed, the executive branch has never questioned that FISA generally falls 
within Congress's power, except to the extent that it infringes on the President's congressionally 
irreducible power under the Constitution.165 
Second, FISA not only falls within Congress's power but also represents Congress's 
careful attempt to enforce the Fourth Amendment.166 Congress considered foreign intelligence 
 
notes __-__ and accompanying text (discussing Congress's power to regulate executive's gathering of 
foreign intelligence). 
164 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. 10-16, 18. 
165 See Seamon & Gardner, supra note __, at 337 n.70 (citing legislative history); see also Keith, 407 U.S. 
at 338 n.2 ("[T]he United States does not claim that Congress is powerless to require warrants for 
surveillances that the President otherwise would not be barred by the Fourth Amendment from 
undertaking without a warrant.").  In commenting on a draft of this article, Judge Posner observed that -- 
unlike Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which empowers Congress to pass laws applicable to the 
states enforcing substantive constitutional provisions, "[t]here is no corresponding authorization for 
Congress to pass laws enforcing … the Fourth Amendment" against the federal government.  E-mail from 
Judge Posner, supra note __.  In my view Congress does have power – under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause -- legislatively to prescribe its judgments on Fourth Amendment reasonableness when Congress 
is regulating federal officials’ enforcement (execution) of laws that Congress enacted under other 
enumerated powers.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. 18 (empowering Congress to enact laws necessary 
and proper "for carrying into Execution" not only other legislative powers but, in addition, "all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the united States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof").  When Congress in the FISA authorized federal agents to conduct foreign intelligence 
surveillance, Congress was entitled to limit this authority -- granted by Congress itself -- in a way that, in 
Congress's judgment, corresponded to Fourth Amendment limits.  Cf. Thomas C. Berg, The 
Constitutional Future of Religious Freedom Legislation, 20 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 715, 728-38 (1998) 
(making a similar point with respect to Congress's power to enforce Free Exercise Clause against federal 
government's actions).  Granted, Congress's ability to limit the scope of its own grants of power to federal 
law enforcement agents differs from Congress's ability to limit the scope of the President's exercise of his 
or her constitutional powers through executive branch agents.  Precisely because of that difference, I 
argue in this article that FISA violates the separation of powers doctrine if FISA is construed to prevent 
the President from taking action necessary in response to a genuine national security emergency.  
Congress cannot infringe on the President's inherent, congressionally irreducible power to respond to 
genuine national security emergencies even when Congress seeks to enforce what it regards as 
restrictions compelled by the Fourth Amendment.  A power in Congress to enforce the Fourth 
Amendment outside the plenary presidential power  is a power to enforce, not a power to define, the 
substance of the Fourth Amendment.  But Congress’s exercise of this enforcement power should affect 
judicial analysis of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, at least when Congress so carefully considers 
Fourth Amendment concerns as did the Congress that enacted FISA.  The resulting legislation supplies 
important evidence on both the governmental interests and the privacy interests that underlie 
reasonableness analysis.  This conclusion finds support in the case law cited supra in note 157. 
166 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-701, at 13 (1978) (bill enacted as FISA "embodies a legislative judgment 
[about the] … procedural safeguards necessary to insure that electronic surveillance … conforms to the 
fundamental principles of the fourth amendment"); S. REP. No. 95-604, at 7-8 (1977) (bill responded to 
finding by Church Committee that prior executive branch surveillance supposedly conducted for national 
security purposes "seriously infringed the fourth Amendment Rights of both the targets and those with 
whom the targets communicated") (quoting Senate Comm. To Study Governmental Operations with 
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surveillance for six years and held as many hearings before enacting FISA.167 Congress 
devoted much of that time to crafting legislation that balanced national security needs against 
Fourth Amendment concerns.168 Throughout the process, Congress consulted with the 
Department of Justice.169 FISA may not be perfect -- especially after 30 years of changes in 
technology and foreign threats -- and it may not reflect the only way to strike the balance 
commanded by the Fourth Amendment -- but it certainly does represent Congress's judgment of 
how the balance should be struck, and Congress made that judgment carefully and based on 
full information.170 
Third, courts should respect legislation, such as FISA, that generally falls within 
Congress's powers and is carefully designed to protect Fourth Amendment rights against 
executive surveillance.171 By respecting such legislation, courts encourage legislative 
enforcement efforts.  Those efforts deserve judicial support because they can produce 
 
Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, S. 
REP. No. 94-755, book III, at 332 (1976) (Church Committee Report)). 
167 See S. REP. No. 95-604 at 7 (1977) (observing that hearings on bill enacted as FISA "were the sixth 
set of hearings on warrantless wiretapping in as many years"). 
168 H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. I, at 22 (1978) ("In drafting this bill, the committee has carefully weighed the 
need "for foreign intelligence electronic surveillance"] against the privacy and civil liberties interests."). 
169 See H.R. Rep. No. 95-1238, pt. I, at 13-14 (1978) (describing Justice Department involvement). 
170 Cf. Ku,  supra note __, at 1360 ("Laws prohibiting certain forms or means of information gathering … 
should limit executive power and define at least minimum levels of privacy and security protected by the 
Fourth Amendment."). 
171 Cf. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1976) (giving weight to federal statutes authorizing 
warrantless felony arrests in determining their reasonableness under Fourth Amendment); Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 290 (1973) ("The Court has been particularly sensitive to the 
[Fourth] Amendment's broad standard of 'reasonableness' when … authorizing statutes permitted the 
challenged searches."); see also Keith, 407 U.S. at 323-24 (discussing Congress's power to regulate 
surveillance for national security); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 250 n.9 (1979) (noting that Title III 
"serves a substantial public interest" by giving government surveillance powers while "carefully 
prescribing" those powers to protect privacy interests);  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (appearing to invite Congress to create remedies 
to enforce Fourth Amendment rights to displace court created remedy); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (considering traditionally close supervision of liquor industry, 
"Congress has broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures" in that 
industry); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 605-06 (1946) (detailing history of federal statutes 
evidencing Congress's "watchfulness against the dangers of police abuses" in exercise of search and 
seizure powers); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928) (stating that, although Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to wiretapping involved there, "Congress may, of course, protect the secrecy of 
telephone messages"); Kerr, supra note __, at 805-06 (arguing that legislatures, rather than courts, 
should "provide the primary rules governing law enforcement investigations involving new technologies"). 
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legislative rules that facilitate judicial enforcement.172 FISA does this, for example, by generally 
requiring advance judicial approval for FISA surveillance.173 Some statutes deserve judicial 
skepticism because they expand executive power with little attention to individual rights.174 
FISA does not fall within that description; it restricted executive power to enforce Fourth 
Amendment safeguards.175 
Legislative rules enforcing the Fourth Amendment can facilitate judicial enforcement not 
only by requiring prior judicial authorization for executive surveillance but also by prescribing 
substantive standards for the surveillance.  Indeed, FISA prescribes an exhaustively considered 
standard for surveillance.176 Legislatively prescribed standards for surveillance can benefit from 
the legislature's ability to gather information relevant to balancing government interests in 
surveillance against individual privacy interests.177 Furthermore, legislatures may be able to 
make clearer standards than those made by courts.  Clear rules, in turn, help officials obey the 
law and give the public notice of what privacy intrusions are authorized.178 In addition, the 
 
172 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 416-29 
(1974) (articulating and defending a rule under which, "[u]nless a search or seizure is conducted pursuant 
to and in conformity with either legislation or police departmental rules and regulations, it is an 
unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by the fourth amendment"); see also Peter P. Swire, Katz Is 
Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 930 (2004) (referring to "the catalog of instances where the 
Supreme Court worked collaboratively with congress to create surveillance rules"); Kerr, supra note __, at 
867-89 (arguing that "legislatures often are better situated than courts to protect privacy in new 
technologies").  But cf. Solove, supra note __, at 761 (arguing that legislative rules are not superior to 
Fourth Amendment protections articulated by courts). 
173 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802 & 1804. 
174 See generally Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice: 
Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 
1089 (1993) (arguing that "legislators undervalue the rights of the accused … [because] a far larger 
number of persons, of much greater political influence, rationally adopt the perspective of a potential 
crime victim rather than the perspective of a suspect or defendant"). 
175 See Seamon & Gardner, supra note __, at 337 & n.70 (citing legislative history showing executive 
branch's awareness that FISA restricted executive power). 
176 See id. at 427-435 (discussing legislative history of FISA's surveillance standard). 
177 Ku, supra note __, at 1375 (legislatures are "better able to develop a factual record with respect to the 
nuances and details of new [surveillance] technologies and their costs and benefits"). 
178 Cf. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987) (statutory program providing for warrantless 
administrative searches "must perform the two basic functions of a warrant: it must advise the [person 
subject to the search] … that the search is being made pursuant to law and has a properly defined scope, 
and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers"); Amsterdam, supra note __, at 418 (arguing that 
police-made rules would be clearer than judge-made rules); but cf. United States v. Grubbs, 126 S. Ct. 
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public may better accept surveillance rules made by their elective representatives than rules 
made by unelected federal judges.179 Legislative rules can be revised if they become 
unacceptable to the public.180 Legislation can restrict the use of information derived from 
surveillance,181 and impose sanctions for violations of those restrictions, including criminal 
sanctions.182 In short, courts have good reasons to give significant weight to legislation that 
enforces Fourth Amendment limits on surveillance.183 
On the flip side, allowing the President to ignore statutory restrictions on surveillance 
encourages executive lawlessness.  Courts should discourage that behavior by preferring 
Fourth Amendment interpretations that encourage the executive branch to collaborate with the 
legislature to frame such rules, rather than defying them.  After all, how is the public to feel 
when an Act of Congress supposedly provides the "exclusive" authority for a specified type of 
surveillance yet they learn that a program exists "outside" that authority and has been going on 
for years?184 Such a situation is likely to undermine public confidence that the nation's leaders 
 
1494, 1501 (2006) (rejecting the argument that victim of search is entitled to a copy of warrant before 
search begins in order to ensure searching officers stay within scope of warrant). 
179 NSA III: Wartime Executive Powers and the FISA Court: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. On the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong.  ___ (Mar. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Senate Hearing of Mar. 28, 2006] (testimony of 
Morton Halperin, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress) (notice to U.S. citizens of "the rules under 
which they may be subject to surveillance by their government in the name of national security" are 
necessary "to secure the necessary support of the American people for the appropriate steps needed to 
reduce the risk of terrorist attacks"), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1825&wit_id=5189. 
180 See Senate Hearing of Mar. 28, 2006, supra note __, at __ (prepared statement of Morton Halperin, 
Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress, and Exec. Director, Open Society Policy center) (notice to 
public of rules for surveillance is necessary so that, if the public "believe[s] the law requires 
reconsideration, they can seek change by lobbying the president and the Congress and by exercising 
their right to vote"). 
181 See 50 U.S.C. § 1806 (regulating the use of information obtained in FISA surveillance); see also 
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (dissemination to third parties of results of 
government-conducted drug tests caused drug testing program for pregnant women to involve a "far more 
substantial" invasion of privacy than prior cases in which dissemination of drug test results was more 
restricted). 
182 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (FISA provision prescribing criminal penalties); cf. Amsterdam, supra note 
__, at 428-29 (arguing that police-made rules could include administrative sanctions). 
183 Cf. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 ("Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the 
Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most 
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.").   
184 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text.  At least before FISA, Title III notified the public notice 
that the President might have power to conduct surveillance outside statutory constraints.  See supra 
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obey the rule of law.   It undermines faith in the legislative branch's willingness and ability to 
check executive abuse and in the President's willingness to abide by legislative restrictions. 
 To implement respect for legislation, such as FISA, that is carefully designed to enforce 
the Fourth Amendment, courts should presume treat surveillance "outside FISA" violates the 
Fourth Amendment.  After all, FISA reflects Congress's judgment, formed with extensive input 
from the executive branch, of what the Fourth Amendment requires.  Treating FISA violations as 
presumptive Fourth Amendment violations simply reflects that, when surveillance violates a 
statute that Congress and the Executive Branch designed to enforce the Fourth Amendment, 
the surveillance is likely to violate the Fourth Amendment.  Thus, this presumption of 
unconstitutionality works like the presumption that the warrantless search of a home violates the 
Fourth Amendment.185 The latter presumption reflects that warrantless searches of homes are 
likely to violate the Fourth Amendment.186 In addition to this probabilistic basis for the 
presumption against warrantless searches of home, that presumption encourages police to 
obtain warrants, just as the presumptive unconstitutionality of surveillance outside FISA 
encourages compliance with FISA.187 In short, both presumptions are rooted in common sense 
and further the Fourth Amendment's function of preventing abuses of power. 
 Of course, the presumptive unconstitutionality of surveillance outside FISA may be 
overcome.  First and foremost, the presumption is overcome by proof that the surveillance was 
 
note __ (describing provision in Title III disclaiming that it limited President's power to protect national 
security). 
185 See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564 (2004) (stating the presumption against constitutionality of 
warrantless searches of the home).   
186 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("With few exceptions, the question whether a 
warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no."). 
187 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (warrant preference discourages police from acting 
without warrant).  In contrast to the presumption of unconstitutionality that I am arguing should attend 
surveillance outside FISA, the Fifth Circuit has held, in the context of a search by Customs officials, that a 
"warrantless seizure or search in the complete absence of authority -- a lawless governmental intrusion -- 
is unconstitutional per se."  United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1074 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).  The 
D.C. Circuit has criticized that holding.  See United States v. Gonzalez, 875 F.2d 875, 877-78 (D.C. Cir. 
1989); see also Barwood v. District of Columbia, 202 F.3d 290, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting argument 
that arrests under ultra vires state law would automatically violate Fourth Amendment). 
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justified by a genuine national security emergency.188 Furthermore, FISA has some 
requirements that are not related to enforcing the Fourth Amendment.189 The government 
should be able to show that surveillance that violates FISA nonetheless satisfies the Fourth 
Amendment because the violation is only technical or insubstantial.  If the government cannot 
make this showing, however, the courts should find surveillance outside FISA to be also outside 
the Fourth Amendment.  By presuming the unconstitutionality of surveillance outside FISA, 
courts can defang the current NSA surveillance program by limiting surveillance largely to 
instances in which it is reasonably necessary to respond to genuine national security 
emergencies.190 
IV. Conclusion 
 Surveillance outside FISA presumptively violates the Fourth Amendment, except when 
the surveillance is justified by genuine national security emergency.  Surveillance outside FISA 
that is justified by a genuine emergency not only satisfies the Fourth Amendment but also falls 
within the President's power even though the surveillance violates FISA.  That is because FISA 
violates the separation of powers doctrine to the extent that FISA tries to forbids the President 
from taking measures that he or she reasonably believes necessary to respond to genuine 
 
188 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text.  The government might also rely on exigencies not 
directly related to a national security emergency or on Fourth Amendment doctrines, besides the exigent 
circumstances doctrine, that allow warrantless searches.  As a practical matter, however, these 
alternatives are not likely to arise often.  Furthermore, as discussed above, neither the special needs 
doctrine nor the border search doctrine supports the NSA surveillance program as a whole.  See supra 
note __.  
189 For example, FISA prescribes the contents of court orders authorizing surveillance.  50 U.S.C. § 
1805(c).  The prescribed contents include a judicial direction that officials "compensate, at the prevailing 
rate," anyone who helps officials accomplish the surveillance -- including the landlord who uses her 
passkey to open the apartment in which a telephone tap is to be placed.  Id. § 1805(c)(2)(D).  A 
surveillance order that omits this direction technically violates FISA, as does a surveillance operation in 
which a landlord assists without receiving compensation.  Yet neither of these technical violations should 
lead to a conclusion that the surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment. 
190As noted above, supra note __, courts can presumably review surveillance under the NSA program 
when the government seeks to use evidence derived from such surveillance in criminal prosecutions.  Cf.
United State v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2005) (reviewing district court's ruling on 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence derived from FISA surveillance).  Judicial review may also be 
available in civil litigation challenging the program, though this remains to be determined.  See Niraj 
Warikoo, Wiretap Suit All About Power, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 13, 2006, at __ (reporting on hearing 
in ACLU v. NSA, supra note __, in which government argues for dismissal). 
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national security emergencies.   The current NSA surveillance program also violates the 
Constitution, however, because it exceeds the President's congressionally irreducible power to 
respond to genuine national security emergencies. 
 As this summary show, the current situation involves unconstitutional conduct by the 
President (in authorizing NSA surveillance that is not justified by a genuine national security 
emergency) and by Congress (in enacting a statute, FISA, that in some instances infringes on 
the President's plenary powers under the Constitution).  Beyond violating the Constitution, the 
President and Congress have created great legal uncertainty: Congress says one thing in FISA, 
the President is doing another in the NSA program.  Thus, the surveillance law on the books 
differs from the surveillance law "on the streets."  This is no way to fight a war on terrorism.   
 Most supporters and opponents of the NSA program now appear to agree on the need 
to make the surveillance law on the books congruent with the surveillance law on the streets.   A 
similar consensus produced FISA.191 As with FISA, new legislation will be contentious and take 
time.  As with FISA, the contentiousness surrounding new legislation stems from the need to 
strike two difficult balances: (1) the balance between national security and "the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches, and seizures"192; and (2) the balance between the President's power and Congress's 
power to strike that first balance.  Even rancorous and protracted debate on those issues is 
better than the current situation.   
 This article seeks to contribute to the debate in two ways.  First, it sheds light on a 
connection that has not received enough attention: the connection between the President's 
power to defy an Act of Congress and Fourth Amendment limits on that power.  Second, in 
exploring that connection, the article offers an analysis that is more nuanced, and stakes out a 
more moderate position, than those offered by most opponents and supporters of the current 
 
191 See Seamon & Gardner, supra note __, at 336-37 & nn. 66-71 (2005) (discussing and citing relevant 
legislative history). 
192 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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NSA program.  The separation of powers analysis offered here neither denies the existence of 
congressionally irreducible power in the President nor supports the President's disregard of 
generally valid legislation.  Similarly, the Fourth Amendment analysis offered here recognizes 
Congress's authority to enforce the Fourth Amendment without treating that authority as 
absolutely binding on the executive branch or the courts.  It is hoped that principled legal 
analysis will facilitate principled and politically feasible proposals for legislative reform. 
